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INTRODUCTION
Federal and state courts across the country are becoming
publicly accessible as never before.
Growing reliance on
computer technology generally and on the Internet specifically,
has made the prospect of placing court case records and
information online via the Internet a reality. Yet, as courts
around the country are discovering, difficult policy questions
arise as courts move from paper to electronic records, move
beyond providing online access to court calendars and docket
information, and begin making case files themselves available
over the Internet.

1. One court has described the internet as follows:
The Internet is accurately described as a 'network of networks.' Computer
networks are interconnected individual computers that share information.
Anytime two or more computer networks connect, they form an 'internet.' The
'Internet' is a shorthand name for the vast collection of interconnected computer
networks that evolved from the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
"ARPANet") developed by the United States Defense Department in the 1960's
and 1970's. Today, the Internet spans the globe and connects hundreds of
thousands of independent networks. The World Wide Web ("the Web" or
"WWW") is often mistakenly referred to as the Internet. However the two are
quite different. The Internet is the physical infrastructure of the online world:
the servers, computers, fiber-optic cables and routers through which data is
shared online. The Web is data: a vast collection of documents containing text,
visual images, audio clips and other information media that is accessed through
the Internet.
In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Over the past several years, federal and state courts across
the country have been making court-related information available
electronically over the Internet. A number of state courts have
provided Internet access to court calendars, indices, rules, and
decisions for a few years now.2 More recently, the federal courts
and a handful of state courts have begun the process of making
case records-the actual documents filed in a case-available for
the first time over the Internet.3

2. See, e.g., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, A QUIET REVOLUTION IN
THE COURTS: ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO STATE COURT RECORDS: A CDT SURVEY OF
STATE ACTIVITY AND COMMENTS ON PRIVACY, COST, EQUITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY,

(August 2002), httpJ/www.cdt.org/publications/020821courtrecords.shtml; Susan J.
Larson, Federaland State Update, (December 2002), http://www.e-courts.org/LarsonFederal-State-Update.pdf; Susan Larson, Public Access to Electronic Court Records
and Competing Privacy Interests, (2001), http://a2j.kentlaw.edu/Insights/2001JERecords/; REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ELECTRONIC ACCESS

TO COURT RECORDS: ENSURING ACCESS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, http'//www.rcfp.org
/courtaccess/viewstates.php (last visited July 15, 2005).
3. For example, the federal courts have established the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records system (PACER) to provide electronic access to case information.
See PACER Home Page, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov (last visited June 26, 2005).
The federal court PACER system currently makes court records available in
"seventy-four district courts, eighty-four bankruptcy courts, the Court of
International Trade and the Court of Federal Claims." See PACER Service Center,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/press.pdf. In addition, as of March 2004 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also has a PACER site. See Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit-Web PACER, http://pacer.cafc.uscourts.gov. (last
visited June 26, 2005). For a comprehensive list of states that provide Internet
access to federal case records, see PACER Web Links, http://pacer.uscourts.gov/cgibin/links.pl. Access to court records through PACER requires registration and a fee
is charged for downloading records beyond a given number of pages. Public Access to
Court Electronic Records: PACER User Manual, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/docume
nts/pacermanual.pdf. (last visited Feb. 26, 2005). In February, 2004, the New York
State Unified Court System announced the recommendations of its Commission on
Public Access to Court Records and began making all public state court case records
available online on a prospective basis. REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS,
(February 2004), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/ReportPublicAccessCourt
Records.pdf; Daniel Wise, State Courts Urged to Place Litigation Files on Internet:
Panel Suggests One Privacy Rule for Print,Electronic Filings, 231 N.Y.L.J., (Feb. 26,
2004), available at Westlaw, 2/26/2004 N.Y.L.J. 1, (col. 3). New York is one of a
number of states to begin making all public court case records available over the
Internet. See Susan Saluny, Court Records a Click Away? Yes, With Some
Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at B4, available at Westlaw, 2004 WLNR
5596310. It is also among several states grappling with the policy implications of
Internet posting for purposes of public access to the courts, individual interests in
privacy, confidentiality, and security, and the sound administration of justice. See
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2; see also Victoria S.
Salzmann, Are Public Records Really Public? The Collision Between the Right to
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Internet access to court records promises greater public
access and greater transparency of court functions. It raises
concerns, however, about the broad dissemination of individual
private or sensitive information contained in court records. The
strongest arguments in favor of making court records available
online are that Internet access increases public access and serves
the interest in "sunshine" or public oversight of the court system.4
The ability to access court records online will make it easier to
obtain those records to review the workings of the courts both as
a general matter and in particular cases and classes of cases.
This availability, its proponents hope, will help demystify court
procedures
and will support greater public education,
accountability, and public confidence. Providing online access to
court records may also serve broader efficiency interests in the
areas of records access, records management, case management,
and electronic filing. 5
Privacy and the Release of Public Court Records Over the Internet, 52 BAYLOR L. REV.
355 (2000); Kristen M. Blankley, Are Public Records Too Public? Why Personally
Identifiable Information Should be Removed From Both Online and Print Versions of
Court Documents, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 413 (2004); Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Privacy and Public Records, httpJ/www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/ (last
visited June 27, 2005); Paula J. Hane, Wider Access to U.S. Court Records Database
Stirs Up Controversy, (February 12, 2001), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/p
ress.pdf; David S. Jackson, Comment, Privacy and Ohio's Public Record Act, 26 CAP.
U. L. REV. 107, 107 (1997); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1255 (2003); Katharine
Webster, Victim Advocates Want Names, Addresses, Records Offline, USA TODAY,
Dec. 1, 2003, available at httpJ/www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/200312-01-victim-privacy x.htm.
4. See, e.g., Stephanie Brenowitz, Deadly Secrecy; The Erosion of Public
Information Under Private Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 679, 707 (2004);
Thomas J. Moyer, Symposium Article: InterpretingOhio's Sunshine Laws: A Judicial
Perspective, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 247, 248-50 (2003); Elletta Sangrey
Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 168-69
(1998); Emily Fiftal, Respecting Litigants' Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle
Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 514-15
(2003); David S. Sanson, The PervasiveProblem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the
Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807 (2003); Richard Zitrin, The Judicial
Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1565 (2004); CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., HON. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, REPORT ON THE NEW YORK STATE

UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM FILING BY ELECTRONIC MEANS AND FILING BY FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION PILOT PROGRAMS PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 367 OF THE LAWS OF 1999 at
22, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/FBEM.pdf. Lipmann states:
As all three branches of New York State government contemplate the future, it
is clear that more and more business between State residents and their
government will be done on an electronic basis ... computer-based interactive
transactions provide individuals with rapid, cost-effective access to government
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Strong opposition exists, however, to placing court records
online. Some opponents argue that the benefits for purposes of
public access and "sunshine" will be minimal. Further, opponents
warn that the newly available court record information will be
used for private and largely nefarious purposes, such as data
mining, stalking, and snooping, which have nothing to do with
public education or court accountability. To these opponents, the
risks associated with making court records available online (as
opposed to allowing access only to docket information and court
decisions) outweigh the benefits of greater public access and
transparency. This is because court records, although public,
often contain sensitive personal information.
Although this
information has always been in court records, opponents argue
that paper records are "practically obscure 7 in comparison to
online records. Obtaining paper records requires a trip to the
courthouse with a party name or index number to retrieve a
particular case record, or hours of reviewing multiple files to
support a broader inquiry. Because court records were deemed
"practically obscure," there was little concern about the
services from virtually anywhere.
Supra note 5. See also Federal Court PACER Web Site, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov
/announcement/general/ecfnews.html; Carrie Kirby, Intimate Details Left Open to
Prying Eyes When Court Documents Posted Online, 26 MONTANA LAWYER 8, 20
(2001); George Prentice, The Future of CM/ECF: Less is More, 23-Oct. AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 28 (2004); Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World,
33 N.M.L. REV. 49 (2003); Blankley, supra note 3 at 423-24; Gregory M. Silverman,
Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and the Question of Public Access
to Court Records Over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV. 175, 179 (2004); Kyla Kitajima,
ElectronicFiling and InformationalPrivacy, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563 (2000).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. SPINELLO, CYBERETHICS: MORALITY AND LAW IN
CYBERSPACE 145 (Boston College, 2d ed. 2003) ("The trend of posting court
documents on the Internet is especially unsettling since those documents sometimes
contain highly sensitive data.
For example, individuals filing for personal
bankruptcy 'must disclose Social Security, bank, and credit card numbers, account
balances, and even the names of minor children'") (quoting Jerry Markon, Curbs
Debated as Court Records go Public on Net, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B1,
available at Westlaw, 2001 WLNR 1986817); CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 2; Webster, supra note 3; Robert Gellman, Public Records:
Access, Privacy, and Public Policy, (1995), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pubrecs/pubrec
.html; ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORM-ATION CENTER, PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/.
7. In United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989), the Supreme Court commented on the phenomenon
of practical obscurity: "Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records
that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and
local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in
a single clearinghouse of information."
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dissemination of personal information from such records.
Providing Internet access to court records increases
exponentially the availability of court records, including any
sensitive information they contain.
Examples of sensitive
information that might be found in court records include: social
security numbers, home addresses, names of minor children,
financial account numbers, and medical information." Online
court records raise concerns that these and other kinds of
sensitive information will be used for improper purposes such as
identity theft, stalking, discrimination, locating domestic violence
victims, and interference with business and social relationships,
rather than for the appropriate oversight, educative, and
accountability reasons for which court records are made public. 9

8. As noted in a report by the Electronic Privacy Information Center:
Court records contain a wealth of personal information. For instance,
bankruptcy filings, which are required by statute to be public, contain personal
identifiers and detailed information on the petitioners' assets. Civil case files
may contain medical information and detailed information on spousal infidelity
and abuse. Criminal case files may contain presentencing reports and the
identity of officers and witnesses in criminal investigations.
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER., PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/publicrecords/default.html.
9. See, e.g., Kathleen Taylor, Executive Director, ACLU of Washington, Court
Records: ACLU Urges Protection for Privacy of Personal Information, Letter to Chief
Justice Gerry Alexander (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.aclu-wa.org/ISSUES/privacy/Priv
acy-CourtRecords.html:
Electronic searching and compiling technologies can convert electronic court
records into a veritable treasure trove of personal information about a vast range
of individuals. Searching across both years and different jurisdictions, one can
easily accumulate a dossier or compile a profile of an individual-valuable in a
number of undesirable manners, ranging from marketing to extortion and
identity theft.
Kathleen Taylor, Letter to Chief Justice Gerry Alexander (Dec. 1, 2003).
Many state courts involved in developing policies governing Internet access to court
records heard testimony about various ways in which the information in court
records might be used improperly. For example, New York's Commission on Public
Access to Court Records heard concerns about identity theft:
Identity thieves often combine "high value" personal identification, such as bank
account or social security numbers, with "low value" information more readily
available to the public, such as name, address, or birth date. Along this
spectrum lies other data, readily available about some people, but not others: for
instance, a prominent attorney's mother's maiden name, might be listed in
Who's Who in America, along with his place and date of birth and his children's
names (which may make his password easy to guess, as well); a CEO's signature
might be accessible for forgery from her compnay's annual report (as attorneys
signatures are available in scanned PDF documents online). Court records often
contain the type of information most often used in identity theft, especially in
consumer cases or class actions.
Ken Dreifach, Chief, Internet Bureau, Office of New York Attorney General to New
York State Commission on Public Access to Court Records 2-3 (May 30, 2003),
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This article addresses the current debate between public
access and privacy in courts around the country as many courts
begin providing Internet access to court docket information and
case records. Section I provides background about the general
concerns about Internet privacy that inform the debate about
placing court records information online, and sketches the
sources and limitations of legal privacy protection, specifically
protection of "information privacy." Section II addresses the
competing interest in public access and government transparency
in the court records context. This section also addresses the
difficulty courts face in protecting individual privacy while
avoiding charges of government secrecy. Section III explores the
effect of the combination of private and public sector data
compilation on the debate. Finally, Section IV proposes that
courts must confront the policy challenge presented by Internet
access. In developing court records access policies, courts should
include stakeholders, while respecting the courts' role in our
tripartite system of government and the purposes of public
access.
The
effective protection
of both individual
privacy/security and government transparency begins with a rehttp://www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/Exhibit3.pdf.
The Commission also heard
concerns about domestic violence and stalking victims:
[Albusers often track and monitor their victims as a means of maintaining
control. These behaviors typically increase when a victim leaves the abuser.
Whenever a victim becomes involved with the court system, whether voluntarily,
as a result of mandatory arrest or pro-prosecution policies or for some other
reason, precious information about her location, status, current name, phone
numbers and other circumstances is disclosed. Such disclosure is a major
concern... We know that abusers will access this information and use it every
way possible to stalk, threaten, assault, or kill the victim and maybe her
children. This can be a problem even where the victim is using the court system
for something other than domestic violence. For example, if she is involved in a
motor vehicle accident resulting in legal action and the information, including
the location of the court, is posted onthe Internet, her address would be posted
making it all too easy for her abuser to find her.
Charlotte A. Watson, Executive Director, New York State Office for the Prevention of
Domestic Violence before the Commission on Public Access to Court Records 3-4
(May 30, 2003), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/Exhibit3.pdf. On the other
hand, some commentators noted possible positive consequences for victims in placing
court records online:
But the Internet cuts both ways. McDonald eventually used online court,
property and death records to show her ex-husband was lying about his finances,
she says. When her ex-husband began coming to child custody hearings in
brand new cars, she found and undisclosed $261,000 from the sale of his late
father's vacation home. As a result, a judge increased his child support
payments. Now he owes more than $20,000 in child support--and she can't find
him.
Katherine Webster, Victim Advocates Want Names, Addresses, Records Offline,
USAToday.com. Dec. 10, 2003, availableat http://www.courtaccess.org/states/nh/doc
uments/nh-article-webster-victimadvocateswantrecoffline-2003.pdf.
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assertion of the balances already struck with respect to
government records generally and court records in particular.
However, because the Internet is causing the courts to respond to
concerns that go well beyond court records, adequate protection
also calls for courts to consider excising from court records high
risk information that is of low value from a public accountability
perspective and to affirmatively educate the bench, the bar, and
the public about the implications of Internet access.
I. BACKGROUND: GENERAL INTERNET PRIVACY
CONCERNS AND THE LAW'S RESPONSE.
He thought of the telescreen with its never-sleeping ear. They
could spy upon you night and day, but if you kept your head you
could still outwit them .... They could lay bare in the utmost
detail everything that you had done or said or thought; but the
inner heart, whose workings were mysterious even to yourself,
remained impregnable.
George Orwell, 1984, Part 2, Chapter 7 (Plume, 2003, c1979)
The Internet and its supporting architectures have made it
much easier to track and monitor individual behavior.
Identifying serial numbers embedded within computer chips or
software programs that allow traces to an end user's identity
threaten to end the electronic anonymity that has so far
characterized many interactions in cyberspace. And Web bugs
and cookies'° allow for an unprecedented level of surreptitious
Internet surveillance.
Richard A. Spinello, CyberEthics, Morality and Law in
Cyberspace 141 (2002)
For many people concerned about individual privacy, the
Internet exemplifies the realization of the Orwellian nightmare of
a society devoid of privacy in which an unseen "Big Brother"
observes, collects, and compiles everything there is to know about
individuals and uses that information to control activities,
behaviors, and even thoughts. Concerns about the privacy and
security of personal information contained in court records are
10. "Cookies" is a computer science term defined as "a collection of information,
usually including a username and the current date and time, stored on the local
computer of a person using the World Wide Web, used chiefly by web sites to identify
users who have previously registered or visited the site." Dictionary.com, http://ww
w.dictionary.reference.comlsearchq=cookies%20.
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directly related to broader concerns about commercial and
government uses of personal information gathered online,
aggregated (often together with offline information), and used for
purposes unknown to (and in some instances not even imagined
by) the data subjects." This lack of knowledge on the part of
individuals about what personal information is being collected,
together with the vast, unprecedented types and quantities of
information that may be amassed using Internet technology has
raised red flags with respect to all data provided online.

A. THE BROADER PROBLEM: ONLINE AGGREGATION AND
DISSEMINATION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Recent reports about far-reaching breaches of security in the
computer databases of several companies, from Lexis/Nexis, to
ChoicePoint, to DSW Shoes (a shoe store franchise) 12 have
heightened public concern about identity theft and other misuses
of personal information stored in computer databases that are
shared and aggregated online. This concern dates back several
years and the commercial and governmental responses have
contributed to the current dilemma facing courts and other
government policymakers when confronted with the need to
balance individual privacy and security concerns with the
interests in providing convenient, broad access to public records,
11. The fact that individuals are largely unaware of the collection and use of their
private information is described by some commentators as the "problem" of privacy in
cyberspace.
Real-space architecture makes surveillance generally self-authenticating.
Ordinarily we can notice if we are being followed, or if data from an identity card
is being collected. Knowing this enables us to decline giving information if we do
not want the information known. Thus, real space interferes with the nonconsensual collection of data. Hiding that one is spying is relatively hard. The
architecture of cyberspace does not similarly flush out the spy. We wander
through cyberspace, unaware of the technologies that gather and track our
behavior ....To consent to being tracked, we must know that data is being
collected. But the architecture disables (relative to real space) our ability to
know when we are being monitored, and to take steps to limit the monitoring.
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501, 510-11 (1999).

12. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches Since the
ChoicePointIncident, (April 20, 2005), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBr
eaches.htm; see also Tom Zeller, Jr., Another Data Broker Reports a Breach, NEW
York Times, March 10, 2005 at C1 (reporting LexisNexis database breach); Paul
Roberts, Hackers Breach LexisNexis, Snatch Consumer Data, COMPUTERWORLD,
March 14, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/databasetopics/data/story/0,10801,1
00317,00.html; Emily Hackett, The Problem of Data Security, TRUSTe Policy Flash,
Vol. 2 No. 4, April 2005, http://www.truste.org/cgidada/mail.cgi?flavor=archive&id=2
0050421012042&list=policyflash.
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to improve transparency and foster more efficient administration.
News about the acquisition and aggregation of large
amounts of personally identifiable information including name,
age, address, work information, financial information, property
ownership, purchasing habits, medical information, and even
clickstream 13 data, by unknown commercial entities caused great
concern among privacy advocates and the public. This concern
turned to outrage on the eve of the millennium, when certain
data profiling practices became public.
For example, when online advertiser DoubleClick's plans to
combine online clickstream data with data collected offline that
would identify individual users and information about them
(including user's name, address, retail, catalog, and online
purchase history, and demographic data) came to light, the
public outcry led to an investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission, a lawsuit by the State of Michigan, and a consumer
class action alleging that DoubleClick's collection and use of
Internet data was improper.14 The plaintiffs' complaint was
dismissed because the alleged violations did not meet the
requirements for finding liability under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, or the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 15 Nevertheless, partly in
response to the negative publicity when DoubleClick's practices
were revealed, DoubleClick agreed to a settlement. 16 The
settlement provided, among other things, that if personally
identifiable information is collected, that information can only be
combined with clickstream data after DoubleClick provides clear
and conspicuous notice to the Internet user and obtains the
Internet user's opt-in choice. 7 The settlement also provided that
"the company's privacy policy will include easy-to-read
13. "Clickstream" is defined as "a series of mouse clicks made by a user of the
Internet, especially logged and analyzed for marketing research; the virtual record of
an Internet user's activity including every Web site and every Web page visited and
how long the user was at each." Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/searc
h?q=clickstream.
14. See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
15. Id. at 526.
16. In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, Master File No. 00-CIV-0641 (NRB),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27099.
17. See Court Approves DoubleClick Settlement; Net Advertiser to Institute New
Protections, UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, May 28, 2002, available at Westlaw, 70
USLW 2742.
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explanations of its online ad services ...and [DoubleClick] will
undertake a consumer education effort, which includes 300
million consumer privacy banner ads that invite consumers to
learn more about how to protect their online privacy."18 Several
other class action lawsuits have been commenced by private
parties against various companies engaging in commercial
aggregation of personal information utilizing the Internet. 19 As in
the DoubleClick case, litigants claimed that "various online
activities have
20 violated the privacy rights of individual users of
the Internet."
Concerns about Internet privacy are not limited to a few
zealous plaintiffs. Studies have long demonstrated significant
public concern about surreptitious online monitoring.
For
example, an FTC report issued in 2000 found "[nlinety-two
percent of those surveyed say that they are concerned about
threats to their personal privacy when they use the Internet and
seventy-two percent say they are very concerned." 2' Furthermore,
ninety-five percent expressed grave concern about the
aggregation of their personal information, specifically, "income,
22
driver's license, credit data, and medical status .... Internet
users also are wary of companies selling their personal
information to third parties. "Ninety-two percent say that they
are not comfortable with Web sites sharing their personal
information..,
and 93% are uncomfortable with their
information being sold."23 One survey mentioned in the FTC
Online Profiling report states that consumers are willing to

18. DoubleClick Settles Class Action Suits, Agrees to Implement Privacy
Protections, U.S. Law Week, April 9, 2002, available at Westlaw, 70 USLW 2622.
The settlement also awarded class counsel $1.8 million in attorney fees and
expenses. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27099 at 9.
19. See, e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir.
2003) (alleging that certain Defendants had intercepted electronic communications
without Plaintiffs consent in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986); In re Intuit Privacy Litigation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(discussing suit computer users brought against website operator, alleging violation
of privacy rights through implementation of "cookies").
20. Charles L. Kerr & Oliver Metzger, Online Privacy: New Developments and
Issues in a Changing World, 701 PLI/Pat 303, 324 (2002).
21. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 14
(2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofilingreportjune2000.pdf
(citing Louis Harris & Assoc., IBM Multi-National Consumer Privacy Survey 81
(1999)).
22. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supranote 21, at 15.

23. Id. at 16.
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provide certain personal information if they are given notice and
24
choice.
However, "the statistics also demonstrate that many
consumers are not willing to allow this • kind
of profiling
,,25
regardlessof whether choice and notice are given.
In the wake of revelations about the aggregation and
dissemination of individual information via the Internet, coupled
with evidence of public concern about Internet privacy, many
called upon government regulators to provide greater protection
of "information privacy." 26 Some even argued that the degree to
which detailed personal profiles of individuals can be developed
by combining and networking various databases of information
without the subjects' knowledge or consent and without their
ability to correct errors or learn of the uses to which their
information is being put, raises significant concerns about the
very meaning and salience of "information privacy" in the
Internet age.27
B. INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION VERSUS THE CALL FOR
GREATER GOVERNMENT REGULATION TO PROTECT INTERNET
PRIVACY

In response to the increasing public concerns about the
aggregation, combination, and dissemination of vast amounts of
personal information, many Internet businesses and free-market
advocates argued that individual consumer privacy could best be
protected through industry self-regulation.2 8
Positing that
24. See Business Week /Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, March 20, 2000, available
at http://businessweek.com/2000/00_12/b3673010.htm.
25. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 21, at 16 (citing Alan F.

Westin, Privacy and American Business, PersonalizedMarketing and Privacy on the
Internet: What Consumers Want (1999)).
26. See, e.g., Marcia S. Smith, Internet Privacy: Overview and Pending Legislation,
Report for Congress, CRS-3, (Feb. 6, 2003), http'//www.epic.org/privacy/internet/RL31
408.pdf ("Consumer, privacy rights and other interest groups believe self-regulation
is insufficient. They argue that the seal programs do not carry the weight of law, and
that while a site may disclose its privacy policy, that does not necessarily equate to
having a policy that protects privacy.").
27. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy
and the Constitution,86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002).

28. See, e.g., Jack Kemp, Self-Regulation for Internet Privacy: Government moves
too slowly to effectively regulate the Internet, (April 5, 2001), http://www.freedomwork
s.orglinformed/issuestemplate.php?issueid=1973&isitsearch=l&searchl=Self-Regu
lation; Tom W. Bell, Internet Privacy and Self-Regulation: Lessons from the Porn
Wars, Cato Institute Briefing Paper #65 (Aug. 9, 2001), http://www.cato.org/pubs/brie
fs/bp65.pdf (noting, among other things, that "what Internet users actually do about
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government regulation of the Internet would stifle this fledgling
technology, they argued that effective self-regulation would offer
greater protection to individuals because Internet businesses and
service providers had an incentive to self-regulate and protect
consumer privacy as a matter of customer service and industry
competition. Companies that wanted to stay in business would
ensure that their customers felt secure in their Internet
transactions.' 9
The incentives to gather and share information for purposes
of target marketing, however, have thus far proven much
stronger than the incentive to protect consumer privacy through
industry self-regulation. 30 As several commentators observe, the
market in detailed, aggregated personal information obtained
over the Internet is a lucrative business, which offers very little
incentive to protect individual privacy. "The field is a large one
that is rapidly growing larger, because consumer information is
an extremely valuable asset . . . . The revenues of the biggest
data-mining companies exceed $1 billion annually... some
companies reportedly earn more form selling customer lists than
from selling their own goods or services.""
privacy sends a distinctly different message from what they say").
29. Another argument supporting the free use of individual personal information
for target marketing highlights the benefits of such use (for customers as well as
businesses) as outweighing any costs to individuals: "After all, the use of personal
information about consumers results in significant benefits for everyone.
For
example, businesses that know a lot about their customers can obviously improve
their efficiencies in marketing, distribution and product development.
This
knowledge inarguably leads to the delivery of less expensive and more useful
products and services. Customers are therefore, largely trading privacy for a more
efficient marketplace. Perhaps because of these benefits, the loss of some personal
privacy is appears quite benign."
Craig D. Tindall, Argus Rules: The
Commercialization of PersonalInformation, 2003 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POLY 181, 183
(2003).
30. See, e.g., Oscar H. Gandy, Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An
Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 79 ("the
pressures will only increase on product and branch managers to learn ever more
about consumers, including the most efficient and effective way to capture their
attention and secure their agreement to buy"); Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise
Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30
WAxE FOREST L. REV. 105, 119 (1995) (noting the United States' rejection of
"proposals for a fair information practices code due to the strong opposition of
American business lobbies").
31. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture:A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2003); see also,
Lawrence Jenab, Note, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy
Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 649-50
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In addition, [clompanies have a financial incentive to obtain
users' personal information because studies show that direct
marketing receives a more favorable response than random ads
sent to online users. Finally, fierce competition on the Internet
results in increased reliance by Web site operators on direct
marketers to attract and retain customers. 32
The extraordinarily lucrative market for compiled and
aggregated personal information has fostered robust resistance to
government regulation to protect individual privacy. The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") initially was persuaded by industry
warnings that government regulation would stifle the
development of the Internet economy. The FTC thus supported
industry self-regulation. "These efforts have been based on the
belief that greater protection of personal privacy on the Internet
will benefit businesses as well as consumers by increasing
customer confidence in the online marketplace."33 The FTC urged
companies to self-regulate, recommending that:
Consumer-oriented commercial Web sites that collect
personal identifying information from or about consumers
online would be required to comply with the four widelyaccepted fair information practices: (1) notice-web sites
would be required to provide consumers clear and
conspicuous notice of their information practices, including
what information they collect, how they collect it (e.g.,
directly or through non-obvious means such as cookies), how
they use it, how they provide Choice, Access, and Security to
consumers, whether they disclose the information collected to
other entities, and whether other entities are collecting
information through the site, (2) choice-web sites would be
(2001).
[Slurveillance of users on the Internet is cheap, and its product (profiles) is
extremely valuable. The result is a simple economic incentive to engage in
surveillance of everyone online, everywhere, all the time, and to compile and
maintain finely granulated records on the entire population of the Internet.
Never before in the history of civilization has such surveillance been possible...
because cyberspace has radically decreased the cost of collecting data, what
might have been economically justified only for the targets of extraordinary
investigations is now justified for the average Jane.
Jenab, supra note 31.
32. Danielle J. Garber, Note, COPPA: Protecting Children's PersonalInformation
on the Internet, 10 J. L. & POLY 129, 143 (2001).
33. FTC REPORT, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 34 (May 2000), http://www.ftc.g
ov/reports/privacy20000/privacy2000.pdf (last-visited Nov. 05, 2005).
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required to offer consumers choices as to how their personal
identifying information is used beyond the use for which the
information was provided... (3) access-Web sites would be
required to offer consumers reasonable access to the
information a Web site has collected on them, including
reasonable opportunity to review the information and to
correct inaccuracies or delete information, (4) security-Web
sites would be required to take reasonable
34 steps to protect
the security of the information they collect.
The Network Advertising Initiative, a group of network
advertisers, was established in 1999 to develop a set of privacy
principles. 5 The NAI worked in conjunction with the FTC on
developing guidelines for Internet industry self-regulation, but,
as noted in an FTC report, despite its significant work in
developing self-regulatory initiatives, "industry efforts alone have
been insufficient."
Thus, the majority recommended that
36
Congress enact legislation to ensure consumer privacy online.
While strong market forces favoring increased consumer
information gathering and compilation have served to limit
effective industry self-regulation to protect individual consumer
privacy interests, government has found itself caught between
the pressures of free market business interests in avoiding
government regulation of the Internet and the clear concerns of
members of the public and privacy advocates about individual
privacy and security in Internet transactions.
Privacy advocates viewed the lack of strong government
regulation to protect Internet users as a betrayal of government's
mandate to protect individual privacy as a "fundamental"
interest. Of course, fundamental, constitutionally-based privacy
protection applies only as against government intrusion. As
noted below, the protection of "information privacy" as against
private actors is based on a patchwork of common law, statutory
and regulatory provisions which are often insufficient to address
the intrusions on individual privacy and security made possible
by Internet technology.
While the FTC, Congress, and other government regulators
34. FTC REPORT, supra note 33, at iii.
35. See Network Advertising Initiative Website, http'//www.networkadvertising.
org/about'privacy.asp (defining the NAI online privacy principles).
36. See FTC REPORT, supra note 33 at ii-iii, 35-36.
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now see the need for government regulation of Internet privacy
and security, they have a way to go before finding effective
regulatory solutions. Part of this difficulty has to do with the
legal framework supporting privacy protection in the Internet
context, which in turn stems from the nature of existing privacy
protection as against both governmental and private intruders.
Another part of the difficulty stems from the nature of, and
pressures on, the legislative process.
C. PRIVACY LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE INTERNET 7
The right to privacy, though not explicitly stated in the
Constitution, is based on constitutional principles and is implicit
in the Bill of Rights, and in concepts of liberty and due process.
As the Supreme Court articulated in Griswold v. Connecticut,
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance ... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.""
Thus, Justice Douglas found a right to privacy to be implicit in
several Constitutional amendments: the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth.39 In striking down a Connecticut statute that
prohibited doctors from advising married couples in the use of
contraceptives, Justice Harlan said that the statute "infringe[d]
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [and]
40
violate[d] basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
37. I provide here only a brief overview of privacy law and its application to the
Internet. For extensive discussions of Internet privacy law, see, for example, Daniel
J. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 27; Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998); Susan E. Gindin, Lost and
Found in Cyberspace: InformationalPrivacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO
L. REV.1153 (1997); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1335 (1996); Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The
Emerging Unencumbered ConstitutionalRight to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 479, 506-08 (1990).
38. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
39. Justice Douglas explained:
The right of association contained in the First Amendment is one, as we have
seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers
'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'
Id. at 484.
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500.
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The Supreme Court has used similar terms to articulate a
fundamental right of privacy in a number of different contexts.4 '
Perhaps the most straightforward constitutional statement
42
of privacy protection is contained in the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth Amendment
privacy
protection
applies against
government intrusion and is based on "reasonable expectations of
privacy." This can be shaky foundation in the Internet age. 4' As
44
a case
the Supreme Court noted in Katz v. United States,
involving electronic eavesdropping in a public telephone booth,
"[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected."45 In the age of
Internet technology as well as increasingly sophisticated and
intrusive surveillance technology (like hidden cameras and even
cell phone cameras) some commentators have labeled the Fourth
41. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (discussing privacy right
relating to inter-racial marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (examining
decisional privacy right to an abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)
(holding that right to marry is part of the "right of privacy" implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding the
right to contraception even for unmarried persons part of right of privacy); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (reaffirming essential holding from
Roe v. Wade recognizing woman's right to choose abortion as part of decisional
privacy right).
42. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
warrants shall issue, but on probable cause supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As one commentator notes:
If privacy was explicitly acknowledged anywhere in the early contours of
American law, it was within the folds of criminal procedure, where even in the
early days of colonial life there existed a strong principle, inherited from English
law, that a 'man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is well guarded as
a prince in his castle.'
Gormley, supra note 37, at 1358.
43. The erosion of Fourth Amendment privacy protection also has been noted with
respect to the government's war on drugs and other "subject matter" such as recent
concerns about terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 2001. See Gormley,
supra note 37, at 1370; see also, Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the
Dissipationof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (2002); Marc
Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1117-19
(2002).
44. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
45. Id.
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Amendment's
protection of privacy based on a "reasonable
expectation" of privacy not only circular, but at risk of offering
very little protection at all.46 As one commentator has put it:
Although the consequences are paradoxical, evolving legal
standards suggest that as an individual's expectation that he
is under surveillance increases, the scope of his expectation of
privacy decreases. Under a governing interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment (and common law extensions to private
entities), individuals who engage in activities that they know,
or should know, may be subject to surveillance are often
treated as having granted consent for such surveillance.4 7
Adding to the confusion fostered by the changeable and
perhaps eroding Fourth Amendment privacy right, there is a
general lack of clarity or consensus about how to define and
protect privacy under law.
First, there is no consensus on the interests that comprise
privacy.
For instance, Jerry Kang describes three
"clusters" privacy concerns with regard to (1) physical space
("spatial privacy"), (2) choice, and (3) the flow of personal
information.
However, Anita Allen-Castellitto divides
privacy in "at least four basic types": (1) informational
privacy, (2) physical privacy, (3) decisional privacy, and (4)
proprietary privacy. Meanwhile, the fathers of privacy law,
Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis, described a
"general right of privacy for thoughts, emotions, and
sensations [that] should receive the same protection, whether
expressed in writing or in conduct,
in conversation, in
48
attitudes, or in facial expression."
These privacy paradigms help identify the ways in which
courts have analyzed privacy interests. However, as with other
attempts to pin down both the parameters of the privacy right
and the nature of privacy interests, the effort to define and locate
46. See, e.g., Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of
Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 857-58 (2002); Anne Meredith Fulton,
Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the Privacy Police? 3 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 63 (1994).
47. Oscar G. Gandy, Legitimate Business Interest: No End In Sight? An Inquiry
Into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 79 (1996).
48. Elbert Lin, PrioritizingPrivacy:A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1093-94 (2002), (citing Jerry Kang, Information Privacy
in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998)).
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the sources and limits of information privacy remains very
difficult, particularly in the context of the Internet intrusions,
which may be deemed both voluntary and involuntary and which
may be described as falling within or outside of the various
traditional privacy constructs. Some of this is due to the nature
of the privacy concept and its need to conform to changing
circumstances. As Ken Gormley puts it: "[t]he tiger has chased
its tail with respect to the ongoing quest for a single definition of
privacy only because privacy (inherently) is not a static concept,
.
,,41
any more than democracy or American life are static conditions.
In addition, even as courts, legal scholars and judges
struggle to define privacy's parameters, there are concerns that
constitutionally based privacy protections are eroding.
For
example, while the Court in Katz held that Fourth Amendment
privacy protection is not limited to physical intrusions (as it had
been under the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Olmstead v.
United States), but is based on "reasonable expectations of
privacy."
This test establishes a conception of Fourth
Amendment privacy that tends to protect only matters that
private individuals have kept "secret," thus severely limiting its
applicability to the kinds of privacy concerns raised in the
technological age. As Daniel Solove observes:
The "reasonable expectation of privacy test" looks to whether
(1) a person exhibits an "actual or subjective expectation of
privacy" and (2) the expectation [is] one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable .... Although we have
moved from the... Olmstead world of physical papers and
places to a new regime based upon expectations of privacy,
there is a new Olmstead, one that is just as shortsighted and
rigid in its approach. The Court's new conception of privacy
is one of total secrecy. If any information is exposed to the
public or if law enforcement officials can view something
from any public vantage point, then the Court has refused to
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy. 50
The Supreme Court's application of the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test has developed somewhat unevenly at
best and at worst appears to have fostered a continuing erosion of
the right of privacy.
For example, the Court has found
49. Gormley, supra note 37, at 1342.
50. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (2002).
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"reasonable" expectations of privacy in homes, businesses, sealed
luggage and packages, and even drums of chemicals, but no
"reasonable" expectations of privacy in voice or writing samples,
phone
numbers,
conversations
recorded
by
concealed
microphones, and automobile passenger compartments, trunks,
and glove boxes.5 '
Recently, the Court held in Illinois v. Caballes that the use
of police dogs to sniff a carS for
drugs does not violate the privacy
52
rights of stopped motorists.
In explaining what may be viewed
as a departure from earlier applications of Fourth Amendment
privacy protection, Justice Stevens wrote:
[T]he use of a well trained narcotics detection dog one that
"does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view," Place, 462 U.S. at
707 during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests. In this case, the dog
sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent's car while
he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion
on respondent's privacy expectations
•. does not53rise to the level
of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.
But the limits of the Fourth Amendment relative to personal
information held in private hands are not new. Based on the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in United States v. Miller,54 it
appears there is no reasonable expectation of privacy against
government acquisition of information held by private entities
(presumably
including Internet companies and information
55
brokers).
In the Internet context, the question is, to what extent does
any constitutionally-rooted privacy right extend to the personal

51. Fred H. Cate, The ChangingFace of Privacy Protectionin the European Union
and the United States, 33 INDIANA L. REV. 173, 199 (1999).
52. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
53. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
54. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 449 (1976).
55. "Most pertinent to... government projects that could involve accessing data
about U.S. persons from commercial databases, the Supreme Court held in 1976 in
United States v. Miller, that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in
objects or information held by a third party." REPORT OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 22 (March 2004),

http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.
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information that is so key to transactions on the Web but that
also may be said in virtually all instances to fall outside of the
conception of "expectations of privacy" based on total secrecy?
The answer to that question may depend on the degree to which
there is recognition of a constitutionally based right of
information privacy.
1.

INFORMATION PRIVACY: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION

Like the right of privacy generally, the right of information
privacy is implicit in several constitutional guarantees. The
Supreme Court first acknowledged a constitutionally-based
privacy interest in personal information in Whalen v. Roe. 56 In
Whalen, the Court upheld a statute requiring that centralized
computer records be maintained on persons who purchased
certain lawful drugs, for which there was also an illicit market,
because it provided protections against disclosure. The disclosure
protections were central to the Court's determination:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files.
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the
direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the
criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great
quantities of information, much of which is personal in
character and potentially harmful or embarrassing if
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory
or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures .... [Iun
some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the
Constitution.57
Indeed, Whalen provides one of very few examples of the
Supreme Court's implicit recognition of a constitutionally based
right of information privacy. 5" In Whalen, the Court separated
56. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
57. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
58. See also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, in which the Supreme
Court applied the balancing test set forth in Whalen, weighing the possible harm to
the individual, given the sensitivity of the information, against the social benefit of
disclosure to determine whether an interest in information privacy should prevent
disclosure of Presidential tapes. Nixon, 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977). More recently,
the right of information privacy was asserted in In Re Crawford, a case challenging a
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the constitutional right to privacy into at least two interests: "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and... the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."
The former-avoiding disclosure of
personal matters-has been widely acknowledged as the Court's
definition of informational privacy.
The vast majority of
commentators
have adopted a very similar definition,
conceptualizing privacy as a right to control the flow of personal
information. 59
The interest in avoiding unwanted disclosure of personal
matters is very much related to the interest in making important
personal decisions or, stated more broadly, the interest in
individual autonomy. Information privacy has been defined as
"an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal
bankruptcy court's inclusion of a bankruptcy petition preparer's social security
number (which was required to be provided) on public court documents. Crawford,
194 F.3d 954 (1999).
There, the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's
articulation of two kinds of constitutionally-protected privacy interests: "One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 958
(citing Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Whalen,
429 U.S. at 599-600)). The Ninth Circuit went on to say "the right of informational
privacy, however, is not absolute; rather it is a conditional right which may be
infringed upon a showing of proper governmental interest." Crawford, 194 F.3d at
959 (citing Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d at 796).
Our precedents demand that we 'engage in the delicate task of weighing
competing interests' to determine whether the government may properly disclose
private information ....

Relevant factors to be considered include: the type of

record requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the degree of need for access,
and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or
other recognizable public interest militating toward access.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court went on to say that these factors are not
exhaustive and that the relevant considerations may vary case by case and will
depend on the overall context. Crawford, 194 F.3d at 959. Although the court
recognized the constitutionally based interest in information privacy and that the
disclosure of the complainant's Social Security number implicated that interest, it
concluded that it did "not appear to constitute a more serious invasion of those
interests than many other requirements imposed by government. Enhanced risk, in
fact, obtains anytime the government requires an individual to deposit identifying
information in the public record." Id. The court then said that to properly weigh the
privacy interest, it must consider the probability of the identity theft feared. Id. The
court distinguished a Social Security number from such sensitive information as HIV
status, sexual orientation, or genetic makeup, which it described as "inherently
sensitive or intimate information." Id. at 959-60. See also Doe v. City of New York,
15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases and holding that there is a recognized
constitutional right of informational privacy and that HIV status falls within that
right).
59. Elbert Lin, supra note 48, at 1094-95.
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the

individual-is

purposes of privacy

protection are said to include "the promotion of liberty, autonomy,
selfhood, human relations, and furthering the existence of a free
society." 61

Some commentators have said that "information

privacy promotes distinct societal values by providing a context
that allows, or creating the conditions in which, individuals may
pursue their personal development '' 62 and that privacy is
"essential to the... maintenance of an autonomous self."63 Given
the importance of the rationales supporting privacy protection,
the absence of a more explicit, robust, and coherent statement of
information privacy protection is somewhat puzzling. As some
commentators have noted, even though information privacy is not
explicitly recognized as a constitutional right, given the
imbalance in power between business and government entities
with Internet access to personal information and individual
subjects, information privacy should be viewed as "fundamental"
and accorded greater legal protection to fill the "vacuum created
between the constitutional principle and the inadequacies of
statutory language. "64 Others have argued for a "limited"
constitutional right to informational privacy that takes into
account the competing interest in public access to government
information.65 There are those who go further and argue that
more explicit, constitutionally-based information privacy
protection should be afforded specifically to protect private
information contained in public records 66
60. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy and Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1205 (1998). Kang notes that this definition of information privacy comes

from Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information ("IITF Principles"),
issued by the Clinton administration's Information Infrastructure Task Force. See
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, PRIVACY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND USING PERSONAL

INFORMATION (1995), www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/privwhitepaper.html.
61. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
62. Lawrence Friedman, Establishing Information Privacy Violations: The New
York Experience, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 655 (2003).
63. Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 81, 82
(1987).
64. Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New
TechnologicalAge, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 908 (1984).
65. Kyla Kitajima, Note, Electronic Filing and Informational Privacy, 27
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 576-78 (2000).
66. See, e.g., Elbert Lin, PrioritizingPrivacy: a Constitutional Response to the
Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2002) (proposing a constitutional right to
informational privacy starting with state constitutions).
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In addition to information privacy protections based on the
federal Constitution as articulated in decisions such as Whalen v.
Roe, some state constitutions arguably provide more robust or
more explicit privacy protection against government intrusion.67
Again, however, the fit between privacy declarations and the
practical ability to protect individual personal information is far
from perfect. Moreover, constitutionally-based privacy protection
generally runs only against government intrusion.68
In the
context of the Internet, there is as much, if not more, concern
about the private collection and aggregation of personal
information as there is about government information-gathering.
2. INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION AS AGAINST PRVATE
ACTORS

Other means of protecting privacy, primarily as against
private actors, include the tort of invasion of privacy, state and
federal consumer protection laws, and privacy protection statutes
enacted to address a range of particular privacy concerns. These
common law and legislative protections have proven to be blunt
and largely inadequate tools for protecting individual
informational privacy and security.
a. The Privacy Tort
The tort of invasion of privacy69 is defined differently from
67. Lin, supra note 66, at 1130-31. "Ten state constitutions [Alaska, Arizona,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and
Washingon] contain explicit provisions for privacy .... Compared with their forty
colleagues, these states have a 'clear opening for following an independent path'." Id.
at1130. However, Lin concludes that, on the whole, state constitutional protection
for informational privacy has been "of little significance" largely because few
information privacy cases have invoked these constitutional provisions. Id. at 1131.
68. But see Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds:
United States Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 357, 366 (2000): ("[Tlhe California Constitution expressly guarantees 'an
inalienable right of privacy.' Moreover, California's state constitutional privacy
provision applies broadly to prohibit interference with privacy both by governmental
and by private-sector invaders," (citing Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal.
App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976)).
69. For a discussion about the origins of the privacy tort beginning with the
seminal 1890 Warren and Brandeis law review article on privacy, see Ken Gormley,
One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1352-53:
The privacy of Warren and Brandeis was a tort notion, but it was meant to
reflect a deeper instinct in the common law. It was meant to preserve an
individual's "inviolate personality," a fragile and intangible thing, quite different
than one's property or person, but essential to preserve a "civilized" and
"cultured" society, particularly in an evolving American democracy which placed
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state to state. As a general matter, traditional tort law privacy
protection is based on four theories: (1) intrusion upon seclusion,
(2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) misappropriation of name
or likeness for commercial purposes, and (4) publicity that places
another in a false light.7 ° While each of these theories might
appear to provide protection against invasions of online privacy,
as a practical matter, their utility in this context is very limited.
For example, the intrusion upon seclusion privacy tort addresses
"[olne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns." 71 For this privacy tort to apply, the invasion must be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. Some courts have held
that the tort does not apply where, as in most Internet
transactions, the provision of the information is considered
"voluntary" even when the uses to which the information is
ultimately put may be unknown to the data subject. 72
Some commentators have argued that the tort involving
public disclosure of private facts could be effective in preventing
the publication of private or sensitive facts (such as a rape
victim's name) over the Internet.73
However, there are
constitutional limitations on imposing liability for disclosure of
private facts that are (1) true and (2) available in court or public
records. For example, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the
Supreme Court held that the state may not impose sanctions on
a premium on the individual. Humankind's own inventiveness had created a
new threat to solitude. The law, as it existed, was not equipped to deal directly
with this new clash between citizen and environment. When the problem
became acute enough, when society as a whole had been steeped in the
consequences of its own ingenuity, a jolt occurred which was strong enough to
create a new layer of law atop the old. The precise catalyst which thus
introduced an explicit right of privacy in 1890, and thereafter led to its slow but
steady acceptance throughout the Untied States, was the transformation of the
American press, photography and the ability to engage in mass-circulation of
information in a newly urbanized society.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652C, 652E (1977). The
categories are not considered mutually exclusive and their application varies among

the states.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
72. See, e.g., Dwyer v. American Express, 652 N.E. 2d 1351,1354 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995):
By using the American Express card, a cardholdeer is voluntarily and
necessarily giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will reveal a
cardholder's spending habits and shopping preferences. We cannot hold that a
defendant has committed an unauthorized intrusion by compiling the
information voluntarily given to it and then renting its compilation.
73. Moira E. McDonough, Internet Disclosures of a Rape Accuser's Identity (Focus
on the Kobe Bryant Case), 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 284 (2004).
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the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained
from public records more specifically, from judicial records
which are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and
which themselves are open to public inspection. 7 4 In addition, as
Joel Reidenberg has noted, common law protection against public
disclosure of private facts
does not address privacy concerns for data collection or
storage. To violate the right, the personal information must
not generally be available or visible to the public and the
information must relate to one's 'private life.' In addition, the
nature of the disclosure must be highly offensive to a
75
reasonable person ....
Reidenberg also identifies significant limitations in the
application of the
upon seclusion,"76 "false light,"77 and
S . "intrusion
,78

"misappropriation" privacy torts in the context of commercial
information processing and sharing.

74. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). The result in Cox
highlights the importance of court policies that, within judicial discretion, limit
public access to information (such as the name of a rape victim) that though part of a
public case is not itself of public concern such that it need be published to the world.
See discussion infra Part III.
75. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontierfor IndividualRights? 44 FED. COMM. L. J. 195, 223 (1992).
76. Reidenberg notes:
[A]n invasion of [the right of seclusion] can only result from the techniques used
to collect personal information. Voluntarily disclosed personal information will
be outside the scope of this right. Even if information is not voluntarily
revealed, the particular means used to collect personal information must be
highly offensive. Surreptitious or secret collections of personal information
without notice or consent may be considered harmful by individuals, yet not rise
to a sufficiently 'objectionable' level to meet the threshold standard. In any
event, this right does not address other data protection practices such as the
storage, use and disclosure of personal information.
Id. at 223.
77. "The false light claim can be made only if there is a wide dissemination of
misleading or erroneous personal information." Id. at 225.
78. Reidenberg states:
"This protection against the misappropriation of one's name may offer coverage
for privacy concerns associated with some commercial data processing activities.
The right originally emerged to address unauthorized endorsements in
advertisements and commercial uses of photographs of individuals. Yet it is
possible that this right could apply to ban certain uses, including dissemination,
of personal information for commercial purposes without consent. However,
privacy concerns associated with the collection of personal information notice
and consent to data acquisition, unnecessary data compilation, and accuracy of
data and the storage of personal information would be outside the scope of the
misappropriation right."
Id. at 225.
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In all of its iterations, the privacy tort is generally
inadequate to protect privacy in the context of Internet
transactions. This is because once a person gives information to
another, he or she is said to have lost the ability to call that
information "private."
Internet transactions, by their very
nature, involve the provision of information to another, rendering
application of this tort virtually nonexistent in the Internet
context.79 Each of the categories of privacy tort contains similar
limitations when applied to the misappropriation and misuse of
information obtained online, which is almost always information
that the individual user has shared in another context.
b. Legislated Information Privacy Protection:
A Disconnected Patchwork
The most promising vehicle for privacy protection is
legislation that creates and enforces the rights of individuals to
safeguard private or sensitive information. However, current
legislative regulation of information privacy may best be
described as an ad hoc patchwork of reactive laws and
regulations rather than a cohesive scheme for the protection of
personal information against unwarranted intrusions by private
(or public) sector actors. While there is no shortage of legislation
designed to address privacy concerns, very little of it has
addressed effectively the concerns raised with respect to the
collection, aggregation, and dissemination of individual personal
information via the Internet.
Numerous federal laws have been enacted to respond to
individual privacy concerns in one way or another. For example,
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"),
an amendment to the federal wiretapping statute, is the
primary federal legal protection against the unauthorized
interception, accessing, use or disclosure of electronic
communications while in transit or in storage. It has two
substantive provisions that may apply in Internet privacy
litigation its prohibition on illegal interceptions of electronic
communications (Title I of the ECPA - 18 U.S.C. 2511 et seq.)
and its prohibition on illegal access to stored electronic
communications (Title II of the ECPA - 18 U.S.C. 2701 et
79. For a discussion of the privacy tort in the Internet context, see Susan E.
Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the
Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1188-93 (1997).
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seq.)80
ECPA is just one of many federal statutes aimed at
addressing privacy concerns that have arisen as a result of
advances in technology. Others include the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act," the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act;"' the
Cable Communications Policy Act, 3 the Fair Credit Reporting
84
Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, 85 and the Driver's Privacy
86
Protection Act, to name just a few.
The DoubleClick litigation provides a good example of the
shortcomings of existing privacy statutes in addressing core
concerns about Internet privacy and security. In DoubleClick,
plaintiffs alleged that DoubleClick was collecting information
about the internet preferences of individual users (including
80. Seth Richard Lesser, Internet Privacy Litigation, 788 PLI/Pat 189, 218 (2004).
81. 18 U.S.C. §1030. According to commentators:
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was the first law to address computer crime
with a specific statute. In 1990, Congress amended it to cover all computers
used in interstate commerce or communications and 'to prohibit forms of
computer abuse which arise in connection with, and have a significant effect
upon, interstate or foreign commerce.' The CFAA is a criminal statute which
also provides a private, civil right of action for any violation of its terms.
Lesser, supra note 80, at 213.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 650 (2004):
The Children's Online Protection Act of 1998 requires operators of Web sites
directed to children under 13 to: (1) provide parents notice of their information
practices; (2) obtain prior, verifiable parental consent for the collection, use,
and/or disclosure of personal information from children (with certain limited
exceptions); (3) upon request, provide parents the ability to review the personal
information collected from their children; (4) provide parents the opportunity to
prevent the further use of personal information that has already been collected,
or the future collection of personal information from that child; (5) limit
collection of personal information for a child's online participation in a game,
prize offer, or other activity to information that is reasonably necessary for the
activity; and (6) establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the
confidentiality, security, and integrity of the personal information collected.
Lesser, supra note 80, at 207.
83. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2001) (prohibits a cable television company from using the
cable system to collect personal information about its subscribers without their prior
consent, and generally bars the cable operator from disclosing such data).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (regulates the collection and use of personal data by
credit reporting agencies).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2005) (prohibits videotape sales or rental companies from
unauthorized disclosure of customer names and addresses, and the subject matter of
their purchases or rentals for direct marketing use. Restricts videotape companies
from disclosing personal data about customers without custormers' consent or court
approval).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 272 (2005) (prohibits state motor vehicle departments from
releasing personal information from driver's license and motor vehicle registration
and title records).
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clickstream data) and planned to combine this information with
"a database of names, addresses, telephone numbers, retail
purchasing habits and other personal
information
on
approximately ninety percent of American households." 7
According to Plaintiffs, this conduct violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), Federal Wiretap Act,88
law.
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") and state
Following a detailed analysis of each statute's applicability, the
court determined that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a
cause of action under any of them. 89 Addressing the plaintiffs
ECPA claim, the court acknowledged that "Internet access is the
relevant electronic communications service" 90 and that "web sites
are 'users' under the ECPA."9' It then concluded that "laill of the
communications DoubleClick has accessed through its cookies
have been authorized or have fallen outside of [ECPAI Title II's
scope."92 The court focused on the relationship between
DoubleClick and its affiliated Web sites and found that the Web
sites had consented to DoubleClick's interception of plaintiffs
communications.93 The court then said that "Title II in no way
outlaws collecting personally identifiable information or placing
cookies, qua such."94
With respect to the Wiretap Act, the court read the relevant
portion of the Act to require an element of "tortious" or "criminal"
mens rea and found none with respect to DoubleClick's actions. 95
The court also found that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that
would meet the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act's damages
threshold.9 6 Having dismissed the federal claims, the court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state law claims.97 Thus, notwithstanding pleading under several
87. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (D. N.Y.

2001).
88. Id. at 499.
89. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526.

90. Id. at 508.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 510.
93. Id.
94. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
95. Id. at 515. "DoubleClick's purpose has plainly not been to perpetuate torts on
millions of Internet users, but to make money by providing a valued service to
commercial Web sites." Id.
96. Id. at 526.
97. Id. The state law claims were pursued by several state attorneys general. "In
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federal statutes apparently designed to protect the privacy and
security of electronic communications, the DoubleClick plaintiffs
were unable to successfully plead a federal cause of action to
address the unauthorized aggregation and sharing of personal
information. 98
In some instances, State consumer protection law has
provided more effective remedies for Internet overreaching than
some of the federal statutes that appear designed protect Internet
privacy. For example, many state attorneys general have used
consumer protection statutes aimed at "deceptive acts and
practices" to prevent Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") from
misleading the public about the collection and use of the
information they provide over the Internet.9 In the late nineties
this was done through the enforcement of privacy policies state
attorneys general sued ISPs that failed to adhere to the terms of
their privacy policies' representations that personal information
would not be shared with third parties. Unfortunately, many
ISPs decided that their interest in trading in individual
information was more valuable than representations not to share
personal information and so they simply changed their privacy
policies to notify users that their information would be shared
with third parties. This left little room for enforcement based on
deceptive practices and, as a practical matter, left Internet users,
who either did not read the privacy policies or assumed that the
existence of a privacy policy would be protective, virtually
clueless about the uses of their personal information and with
scant means of preventing unwanted uses.
August 2002, the New York and ten other Attorneys General settled an extensive
investigation into the privacy practices of third party marketer and ad server
DoubleClick .... " Kenneth M. Dreifach, Data Privacy, Web Security, and Attorney
General Enforcement, 828 PLI/Pat 401, 414-15 (2005). The Assurance required
DoubleClick to disclose its activities in a privacy policy, and to monitor these
disclosures; to segregate data acquired through its advertising/contracting from its
profiling functions; to submit to outside privacy audits over 4 years' and to pay the
collective states $450,000. Id. at 415.
98. See also In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 12-15 (D.
Mass 2002) (finding that a company's use of Web site tracking devices to collect
personal data from visitors to pharmaceutical Web sites did not violate the federal
wiretap Act, ECPA, or the CFAA.)
99. See Kenneth M. Dreifach, Data Privacy, Web Security, and Attorney General
Enforcement, 828 PLI/Pat 401, 408-11 (2005) (describing New York state law bases
for Internet consumer privacy protection); Joel Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in
Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 889 (2003) ("Like the federal action, the
state cases that rely on 'unfair deceptive acts and practices' statutory authority do
not address the public wrongs directly").
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Despite the challenges created by the limitations in many of
the statutes enacted to protect specific aspects of individual
privacy, Congress continues to propose and enact legislation in
response to narrow, specific privacy concerns that come to the
public's attention rather than re-thinking individual privacy
protection more broadly.'0 0 Some observers attribute this ad hoc,
reactive and narrowly targeted approach to First Amendment
concerns about the free flow of information coupled with the
business
community's
preference
self-regulation.
'01 The
limitations of existing privacy legislation may be attributed in
part to the narrow interests of elected legislators in responding to
public outcry while at the same time not doing too much to upset
the powerful business interests that have a large stake in the
trade of detailed individual information.
Whatever the reason, the protection of information privacy
has been left to vague (and arguably diminishing) constitutional
protections against government intrusion, common law tort
actions that are largely ineffective, and a patchwork of state
consumer protection laws and narrowly targeted state and federal
laws addressing very specific aspects of information privacy
protection.
Despite a long list of federal and state laws
addressing privacy, gaping holes remain in the protection of
individual privacy in almost every context. Furthermore, the
seemingly endless list of privacy legislation proposed over the last
five years seems unlikely to respond effectively to these concerns
given the reluctance of lawmakers to address individual privacy
at a broad policy level. Still, the most appropriate place for
government intervention in preserving and protecting privacy is
100. See, e.g., S. 1789, 109th Cong. § 103 (2005) (amending FCRA to impose a fraud
alert system upon credit reporting agencies); see also Epic Bill Track (2005),
http://www.epic.org (providing a list and description of the bills currently before
congress affecting internet privacy); Dreifach, supra note 97, at 420-21 (discussing
Internet privacy legislation in the 109th Congress).
101. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that
imposing damages on a newspaper for publishing a rape victim's name pursuant to a
state statute prohibiting such publication violated the First Amendment). As one
commentator has noted:
[Liegislatures respond only to specific issues. Legal standards are justified only
where targeted for a particular problem: therefore, standards often develop on
an ad hoc basis, by reaction to public scandals. Examples include the protection
of video rental records following the disclosure of records for a nominee to the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which was enacted in
response to consumer horror stories about dealing with credit reporting agencies.
Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and
Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 114 (1995).
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through legislation.
Fortunately, some promising legislative proposals aimed at
protecting privacy more comprehensively and practicaly have
begun to appear in response to broadening concerns about
hackers acquiring vast amounts personal information.
For
example, a recent California law requiring information brokers to
disclose to customers security breaches, resulting in the
unauthorized dissemination of their personal information, 102 has
shed light on numerous data breaches and prompted calls for
103
similar legislation on the federal level.
United States Senator
Dianne Feinstein has introduced a similar breach notice law on
the federal level that would provide consumers nationwide with
notice of security breaches
that might involve their personal or
04
sensitive information.
While much of this legislation, like earlier privacy
legislation, is reactive, 105 current legislative proposals are
beginning to focus on placing some measure of power in the hands
of data subjects, an approach that is more likely to be effective in
addressing the core concerns about Internet privacy. In contrast
to much of the earlier privacy legislation which focused on the
particular kind of information at issue or the methods of
collection or transfer employed, some of the current proposals
focus on informing and involving the data subjects in more
106
meaningful ways.

102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2005).
103. Grant Goss, ChoicePoint's Error Sparks Talk of ID Theft Law, PC WORLD,
Feb. 23, 2005, http'//www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid,119790.00.asp (search term

ChoicePoint) (discussing how the discovery that data

collector ChoicePoint

mistakenly gave away the private information of over 145,000 U.S. residents to
identity thieves renewed calls for a national data privacy act).

104. S. 115, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). This bill, referred to as the "Notification of
Risk to Personal Data Act," would "require federal agencies and persons engaged in
interstate commerce, in possession of electronic data containing personal information
to disclose any unauthorized acquisition of such information." BILL SUMMARY AND
STATUS FOR THE 109TH CONGRESS (2005), http'//www.thomas.loc.gov/cgi~bin/bdquery
/z?dl09:s.00115.
105. See supra note 103 (discussing the ChoicePoint breach).
106. Such proposed legislation comes closer to effectuating the fair information
principles of notice, choice, access, and security, acknowledged by the FTC and others
as critical to effective Internet security. See FTC REPORT, supra note 33, at 3-4.
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II. THE INTERNET PROMISES GREATER PUBLIC
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS AND GREATER
TRANSPARENCY OF COURT FUNCTIONS, BUT
HIGHLIGHTS THE PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY IN
PROTECTING INDIDUAL PRIVACY WHILE
PREVENTING GOVERNMENT SECRECY
Against a backdrop of intense concern about information
privacy protection, it is possible to lose sight of the Internet's
promise of greater transparency. 107 To some observers, the
Internet promises to shed ever greater light on government
operations, allowing the public to obtain information, participate
in politics and government affairs, and engage in oversight of
government as never before. For example, Internet access now
allows people to obtain information about legislation, rulemaking,
and budget decisions that traditionally have been difficult to
locate. E-government acts have made it easier for citizens to gain
access to government information and services, such as driver's
license applications and tax filings. The Internet has improved
the citizen oversight function in many ways by providing online
access to information about campaign contributions, the voting
records of representatives, and yes, court indices, calendars, and
decisions.' °9

107. See Solove, supra note 27, at 1173. Solove observes that:
There are at least four general functions of transparency: (1) to shed sunshine on
governmental activities and proceedings; (2) to find out information about public
officials and candidates for public office; (3) to facilitate certain social
transactions, such as selling property or initiating lawsuits; and (4) to find out
information about other individuals for a variety of purposes.

Id.
108. As a 2003 Report to Congress on Implementation of the E-Government Act
explains:
E-Government is the use of information technology (IT) and the Internet,
together with operational processes and people needed to implement those
technologies, to deliver services and programs to constituents, including citizens,
businesses and other government agencies.
E-Government improves the
effectiveness, efficiency and quality of government services.
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FY 2003 REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT 1 (March 8, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/fy03_egovrpt-to-congress.pdf.
109. See generally ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE
INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW
(1999).
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A. PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT RECORDS Is GENERALLY
VIEWED AS AN ANTIDOTE TO GOVERNMENT SECRECY

In the context of public records, some argue that restricting
access in the service of privacy, is likely to yield something worse
than the sharing of too much individual information: increased
government secrecy. 1 ° To these observers, overzealous efforts to
protect so-called "private" information contained in public
records, will only serve to create more secrecy in government
operations without necessarily improving privacy protection."'
The government will continue to amass vast amounts of
information about its citizens, but individuals will be less able to
observe government functions. The concern about government
secrecy, particularly with respect to the immense amount of
information being gathered about individuals, raises concerns
about government control, manipulation, and punishment, and
impairing individual autonomy through boundless, unseen
surveillance:
we can see the primary principle of the Panopticon in
operation. The Inspector, now the Bureaucrat, scans the
subjects, now the Society, rendered as transparent as
possible to his gaze. The transparency, however, is not twoway, as the state jealously guards itself through
administrative secrecy. It appears to the subjects as an
impenetrable object (and separated as administration is from
politics, not directly accountable to democratic voters.)
Coercion lurks in the background of course, as an underlying
sanction encouraging compliance with a state which has a
high likelihood of seeing and noting infractions of its rules."112
•

This vision of the panopticon

113

operated by the secret and

110. See Marc Rotenberg, Restoring a Public Interest Vision of Law in the Age of the
Internet, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 7, 18 (2004) (discussing the relationship

between privacy and secrecy, how often people conflate privacy and secrecy, and the
important difference between protecting individual privacy and promoting
government secrecy).
111. Id.; see also Martin E. Halstuck, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The
Escalating Conflict Between ConstitutionalPrivacy and the Accountability Principle
of Democracy, 4 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71, 73, 92 (2003).
112. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY, 43 (1999).

113. As Dorothy J. Glancy explains:
Bentham's concept of a panopticon prison made each prisoner's every movement
continuously visible to guards who could watch all of the prisoners all of the
time. Bentham noted that in practice it would not be necessary to have guards
actually watch each prisoner at every moment. Simply the potential for complete
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coercive state or Bureaucrat stands in contrast to efforts by
courts to provide greater access and transparency to public court
records by making them available over the Internet. However, it
is not an unrealistic assessment of some of the operations of
government particularly in the context of law enforcement
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.11 Indeed,
the combination of government collection of vast amounts of
individual personal information and government secrecy about
the contents and uses of that information present a threatening,
autocratic, and anti-democratic vision of government that calls to
mind Kafka's The Trial, Orwell's 1984, and Bentham's
Panopticon.
The recent case, Doe v. Ashcroft, 5 provides an extreme
example of government secrecy in the context of Internet
information gathering. In Doe, an Internet service provider (ISP)
brought a constitutional challenge against 18 U.S.C. § 2709,116 a
statute authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compel
communications firms, such as ISPs to produce certain customer
records whenever the FBI certifies that those records are relevant
to an authorized investigation to protect against terrorism. 117 The
and continuous visibility would cause each prisoner to watch himself all the
time. Such a system would, Bentham argued, give the state even more power
over prisoners than keeping the prisoners bound in chains. In short, the
panopticon was designed to give authorities intense control over prisoners.
Concerns about abject conformity and warped human personalities that could
result from such a dystopian everyone-is-visible-all-the-time regime was, of
course, part of the searing image of an all-seeing Big Brother in George Orwell's
novel, 1984.

Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 295, 320 (2004).
114. See Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1115 (2002) (examining "diminishment of privacy by legal means" following

September 11).
115. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
116. Ironically, "Section 2709 was enacted as part of Title II of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), which sought to 'protect privacy
interests' in 'stored wire and electronic communications' while also 'protecting the
Government's legitimate law enforcement needs."' Id. at 480. Congress looked to the
Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA") of 1978 as a model for the ECPA. Id. The
RFPA was passed primarily in response to cases like United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976), which held that customers of a financial institutions could not bring
a Fourth Amendment claim to contest government access to financial records. Id.

"In passing Title II of the ECPA eight years later, Congress feared that customers of
electronic communications services would ... find little Fourth Amendment
protection from Government access to their records, thus creating the need for
privacy legislation." Id. at 481.
117. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 at 474-75 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2709).
Relevant portions of § 2709 state:
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FBI's requests take the form of national security letters ("NSLs"),
which bar the recipient ISPs from ever disclosing to anyone
(presumably, by the statute's terms, including their lawyer) that
they have received such letters."" The ISP, ("Doe"), challenged
these national security letters as unconstitutional on their face
and as applied, in that they give the FBI "extraordinary,
unchecked power to obtain private information without any form
of judicial process" (in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments) and that the statute's absolute nondisclosure
provision "burdens speech categorically and perpetually, without
any case-by-case judicial consideration of whether that speech
burden is justified."" 9 In determining that the NSLs were
unconstitutional, District Judge Victor Marrero noted that not
only did they violate the rights of the ISP, but they also could be
used to infringe ISP subscribers' rights. 12 The district court
based its holding on Supreme Court doctrine providing that
"compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
advocacy" amounts to a "restraint on freedom of association"
where disclosure could expose the members to "public hostility."12'
The district court's description conjures the principle of the
panopticon at work:
For example, the FBI theoretically could issue to a political
campaign's computer systems operator a §2709 NSL
compelling production of the names of all persons who have
email addresses through the campaign's computer systems.
The FBI theoretically could also issue an NSL under §2709 to
discern the identity of someone whose anonymous online web
log, or "blog," is critical of the Government. Such inquiries
might be beyond the permissible scope of the FBI's power
(a) Duty to provide. A wire or electronic communication service provider shall
comply with a request for subscriber information and toll billing records
information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or
possession made by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under
subsection (b) of this section . . . . (c) Prohibition of certain disclosure. No wire
or electronic communication service provider, or officer, employee, or agent
thereof, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
sought or obtained access to information or records under this section.

18 U.S.C. § 2709 (a), (c) (2001).
118. Doe v.Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 506.
121. Id. at 507 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that state
could not compel association to produce records identifying its members and agents
without entailing a substantial likelihood of offending and infringing upon the
freedom of association)).
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under § 2709 because the targeted information might not be
relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,
or because the inquiry might be conducted solely on the basis
of activities protected by the First Amendment. These
prospects only highlight the potential danger of the FBI's
self-certification process and the absence of judicial
oversight. 122
Thus, Doe v. Ashcroft presents an egregious example of
secret and pervasive government information-gathering without
any public or legal oversight. In that case, the secrecy was the
function of the Executive Branch's issuance of national security
letters, and the remedy for such secrecy was with the courts.
Government record-keeping and information-gathering takes a
variety of forms and results in the accumulation of vast amounts
of personal information. 123 Often, it is said, the best check on
government abuse of its authority in the context of societal
surveillance is to provide public access to, and judicial oversight
of, these governmental activities. As Judge Marrero noted in Doe
v. Ashcroft:
In general, as our sunshine laws and judicial doctrine attest,
democracy abhors undue secrecy, in recognition that public
knowledge secures freedom.
Hence, an unlimited
government warrant to conceal, effectively a form of secrecy
per se, has no place in our open society. Such a claim is
especially inimical to democratic values for reasons borne out
by painful experience. Under the mantle of secrecy, the selfpreservation that ordinarily impels our government to
censorship and secrecy may potentially
be turned on
1 24
ourselves as a weapon of self-destruction."
Indeed, an important counterpoint to concerns about
individual privacy in the context of placing court records on the
Internet is the competing and legally recognized interest in

122. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
123. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002) (attempting to define a
theoretical approach to strike an "appropriate balance between privacy and effective
law enforcement"). Id. at 1088.
124. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp. 2d at 519-20, n.241-42 (citing, as example of
importance of public knowledge, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. §
552, and cases decided thereunder).
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government transparency-in providing public access to
information about government functions.
This interest in
transparency is deemed particularly potent in the context of court
proceedings and records largely because of the important role the
courts play in ensuring adherence to law and securing
fundamental constitutional rights.
Proponents of broad Internet access to court records say such
access will serve this interest in transparency. 125 Internet access
to court records can serve to de-mystify court operations, provide
public information and oversight of the judicial function, and
support accountability and public confidence. In the context of
court records, some supporters view Internet access as a window
on a fundamental public process that had been "practically
obscure." In this way, providing broad Internet access to court
records could be seen as a move away from the negative notion of
government as the unseen, secret collector of information and as
a way to distinguish the courts from government institutions that
collect, disseminate, and use information in secret to exert power
over individuals and society.
Yet as noted below, competing interests confront court
systems, as obvious tensions exist between the right of openness,
on the one hand, and concerns about privacy, security, fairness,
and court administration, on the other. Therefore, although the
impulse toward greater openness and public access is to be
welcomed and encouraged, a completely unqualified policy of open
access is not a viable choice for courts. At the same time, courts
must carefully consider how they might develop policies designed
to provide greater access for the appropriate purposes of
providing public information, oversight, and accountability, while
protecting legitimate interests in individual privacy and security
and fostering effective judicial administration.

B. THE LAW RECOGNIZES A CONSTITUTIONALLY-BASED,
THOUGH QUALIFIED, RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT
RECORDS
A long recognized presumption
of public access to court
S
126
records exists in the common law.
While "[tihere is not yet any
125. See, e.g., Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Homepage,
http://www.rcfp.org; see also infra note 134.
126. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(plurality concluding that the right of the press and the public to attend criminal
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definitive Supreme Court ruling on whether there is a
constitutional right of access to court documents and if so, the
scope of such a right[,]" the common law presumption in favor of
access to court records is fairly strong. 12 The Supreme Court
articulated this common law right of public access to court
documents in Nixon v. Warner Communications: "It is clear that
the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and
copy public records and documents, including judicial records and
documents." 12 This right is designed to promote public confidence
in the judicial system and to diminish the possibilities for
injustice, perjury, and fraud. 129 However, as the Court noted in
Nixon, the "right to inspect and copy judicial records is not
absolute. Every court has supervisory power over its own records
and files, and access has been denied where court files might
have become a vehicle for improper purposes. 3 To determine
whether access to a judicial document legitimately may be denied,
the court must engage in a balancing test, inquiring whether the
right of access
is outweighed by interests favoring non31
disclosure.1
Some argue that the presumption of public access to court
records is constitutionally based and can only be overcome by the
demonstration of a compelling interest. 32 Those who make this
trials is a constitutional right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to an exclusion of the public and the press from criminal trials, and a statute
will not survive that scrutiny on the sole asserted interest of protecting minor
victims of sex crimes); Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.
1984) (applying heightened or intermediate level of scrutiny where the public and the
press are restricted from access to civil trials and, therefore, requiring important
governmental interest and a less restrictive way to serve that interest); Associated
Press v. United States District Court, 705 F. 2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1984) (vacating
closure orders of defendant, U.S. District Court, in connection with a criminal trial
and affirming public's First Amendment rights to access to these proceedings). But
see United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding order of
court sealing certain documents survived strict scrutiny because the order was
'sufficiently narrowly tailored").
127. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 595.
130. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
131. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602; see also United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811
(10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that presumption in favor of availability exists).
132. See, e.g., Eugene Cerruti, "Dancingin the Courthouse:" The FirstAmendment
Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 241 (1995) (arguing for

restatement of right of accessibility "as a systemic right of access to all deliberative
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argument often cite the Supreme Court's decision in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia as support.
However, Richmond
Newspapers stands for the "right of the public and the press to
attend criminal trials" and does not extend to a constitutionally
13
grounded right of access to all court records and information.
Yet, as Arthur Miller has observed:
[An intense, nationwide campaign is underway to create a
'presumption of public access' to all information produced in
litigation that would seriously restrict the courts' traditional
discretion to issue protective and sealing orders shielding
litigants' documents from view . . . . [T]he more extreme
proponents of increased public access seek to give the halls of
justice walls of glass, so that nothing is withheld from the
public eye,
• 1, no
134 matter how private, insignificant, or inaccurate
it might be.
These same proponents have made the argument that there
is a constitutionally based right of public access to court records
and public documents in the context of shaping court policies
regarding Internet access to court records.135
Advocates of
information within the judiciary").
133. In Globe Newspaper Co., a case overturning a Massachusetts law that was
interpreted to require exclusion of the press and public during testimony of minor
victims of alleged sex offenses, the United States Supreme Court expressly
reaffirmed that Richmond Newspapers dealt only with that access to criminal trials.
457 U.S. at 611. Two later decisions, Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court I, 464
U.S. 561 (1984) (upholding access to voir dire examination of potential jurors in a
criminal trial absent findings that would justify closure in a particular case) and
Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court 11, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (allowing further press
access to transcripts of a preliminary hearing in a criminal case), extended the
Richmond Newspapers holding somewhat, but only in the context of a criminal trial.
See Comments of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section of the New York
State Bar Association to the Commission on Public Access to Court Records (July
2003) available at httpJ/www.nycourts.gov/ip/publicaccess/links.shtml.
134. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 429-31 (1991).
135. See Martha Wade Steketee & Alan Carlson, CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR
PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS,

5 (Oct. 18, 2002), http'//www.courtaccess.org/modelpolicy/18Oct2002FinalReport.pdf.
The report states:
Many members of the Advisory Committee expressed the view that the
presumption of openness is constitutionally based, requiring a "compelling
interest" to overcome the presumption. Other members expressed the view that
the law in this area is evolving. The Joint Court Management Committee of
CCJ and COSCA took the position that, because the issue may well come before
courts of last resort, the CCJ/COSCA Guidelines should not take a position as to
the applicable legal standard.
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completely unrestricted Internet access to court records have
made their point quite forcefully to court systems in the process
of developing policies to balance public access with privacy,
security, court administration and other concerns.136
For example, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press advocates for virtually no overarching court policy to
address privacy, security or administrative concerns when
providing online access to court records beyond a very narrow
application of the case-by-case analysis in which judges already
engage (most often, only when prompted by the parties). The
Reporters Committee is among the leading advocates of the view
that the public right of access to court records is constitutionally
based and near absolute. Yet, as a legal and practical matter, the
right of access in the context of court records must be limited.
This limitation is not only necessary because of "vague" interests
in individual privacy, but also to ensure that access to court
records serves appropriate public functions, including not only
privacy and security, but also the sound and efficient
administration of justice. As Daniel Solove notes:
[E]ven under an expansive view, the right to access does not
apply to efforts to restrict the access to personal information
for particular uses. When public records illuminate
government functioning, access to government records is
136. For example, the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press issued the
following talking points regarding online access to court records:
Here are the key considerations for openness advocates to make when
considering the drafting of a court access policy:
Information available at the courthouse should be available online. Allowing
access to particular records only at the courthouse means courts believe in public
access only when it's not practical.
The best way to accommodate legitimate privacy interests is to allow judges to
make case-by-case decisions to restrict access to particular information in files, if
the requestor can demonstrate a compelling need.
Electronic access rules should not impose such a burden on court personnel
that individual courts will soon have backlogs of records waiting for "approval"
before being made available online.
Records made available electronically for judges and lawyers should be
available to the public, for the same reasons judges and lawyers find this method
of access beneficial.
Electronic access ensures that the public and the news media can oversee how
justice is administered like never before.
"Privacy" is a vague interest that, without attempts to concisely define what it
means, cannot justify barring access to a wide range of information that is
important to the public understanding of the court system.
THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO
COURT RECORDS: ENSURING ACCESS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, http'/www.rcfp.org/co

urtaccess/talking.html.
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generally consistent with the rationale for the First
Amendment right to access. However, the grand purposes
behind the right to access are simply not present in the
context of much information gathering from public records
today .... In fact, the Constitution does not simply require
open information flow; it also establishes certain
responsibilities for the way that the government uses the
information it collects.'
Courts have long exercised supervisory power over their
records to avoid the use of court records for improper purposes.
This power is consistent with other governmental efforts to
balance the interest in public access to government with
competing interests in individual privacy, security, and
governmental administration. For example, the federal Freedom
of Information Act l s and its state law counterparts, while
designed to encourage broad public access to government
information "to ensure an informed citizenry, [which is] 'vital to
the functioning of a democratic society,"' 139 include several
exemptions that mirror the concerns raised in the context of court
records. On the federal level "[tihe Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") and Privacy Act... do not apply to the judicial branch
and do not govern access to case file documents."14 ° Most state
courts also are not subject to state freedom of information laws.
However, many court systems have statutory, regulatory, and/or
common law counterparts that favor public access, but permit
nondisclosure for "good cause" shown sometimes articulating a

137.
138.
139.
140.

Daniel J. Solove, supra note 27, at 1203-04.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002).
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
Robert Deyling, Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in the Federal

Courts 5, ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, OFFICE OF

JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Dec. 15, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.pdf (citing 5
U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B) & 552(f)); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992,1013 (3d Cir.
1988) (stating that certain federal disclosure statutes "by their terms do no apply to
the judiciary"); Warth v. Department of Justice, 595 F.2d 521, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that "the provisions of the FOIA impose no obligation on the courts to
produce any records in their possession").
141. For example, Section 216. 1(a) of the New York Rules of Court provides that:
[e]xcept where otherwise provided by statute or rule, a court shall not enter an
order in any action... sealing the court records, whether in whole or in part,
except upon a written finding of good cause, which shall specify the grounds
thereof. In determining whether good cause has been shown, the court shall
consider the interests of the public as well as of the parties.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 216.1 (West 2005).
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very strong presumption favoring openness.1
Notwithstanding
this presumption of openness, several courts have been criticized
for erring on the side of closure and permitting secrecy
in the
4
1
settlement of cases involving issues of public safety.
C. Concerns About Secrecy Complicate Court Efforts
to Balance Public Access and Privacy When Placing Court
Records on the Internet
Concerns about shielding from public view records and
information which are in the public interest have further
complicated the access/privacy debate regarding online court
records. As advocates of privacy, domestic violence prevention,
consumer protection interests, as well as those representing
145
clients in matrimonial T4 and juvenile cases,
urge courts to
shield certain classes of information in court records from broad
Internet access, efforts are still being made to curtail courts' use
142. See, e.g., Rule 243.1(d) of the California Rules of Court, stating that:
[t]he court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds
facts that establish: (1) [there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the
right of public access to the record; (2) [t]he overriding interest supports sealing
the record; (3) [a] substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will
be prejudiced if the record is not sealed (4) [tlhe proposed sealing is narrowly
tailored; and (5) [nlo less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding
interest.
CAL. RULE OF COURT 243.1(d) (West 2005).

143. Compare Elizabeth E. Spainhour, Unsealing Settlements: Recent Efforts to
Expose Settlement Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards, 82 N.C. L. REv. 2155
(2004) (arguing that protective orders appended to private settlements which conceal
public hazards should be declared void as a matter of public policy), with Laurie
Kratky Dore, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's New
Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlments, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791 (2004) (suggesting
that judicial involvement regarding access to documents may be more important as
regards pre-trial discovery and documentary evidence than sealing terms of a
settlement); see also Stephanie S. Abrutyn, Commentary, Courts Are Just as Guilty
in Church Coverup, HARTFORD COURANT, May 26, 2002 at C1, http://www.courant.c
om; Mike France, The Hidden Culprit: The U.S. Legal System, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE, Sept. 18, 2000, http:/www.businessweek.com/2000/0038/b3699193.htm (dis

cussing public access to civil litigation when serious public safety concerns are
involved).
144. See Laura W. Morgan, Strengthening the Lock on the Bedroom Door: The Case
Against Access to Divorce Court Records Online, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW

45 (2001) (arguing that divorce records and files should be presumptively private, as
compared to other proceedings).
145. See Stefanie Martin, Note, Confidentiality of Juvenile Proceedings vs. The
FirstAmendment Guarantee of Public Access: Does the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act Require Closed Proceedings?23 J. Juv. L. 79, 89 (2002) (urging that "due process
and other constitutional considerations" must be reconsidered "in juvenile
adjudication").
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of sealing orders. These efforts to limit the use of sealing orders
focus on concerns about denying the public access to information
about court cases addressing potential hazards that would
otherwise be brought to light, to the benefit of the broader society.
The concern about "secret settlements" stems from truly troubling
incidents, such as the use of court-sanctioned sealing of litigation
as part of settlement agreements to conceal Bridgestone tire
defects that were responsible for numerous accidents, as well as
to shield from the public a pattern of child sexual abuse
146
allegations against priests. Indeed, over the last few years, a
number of states have enacted or considered legislation which
curtails the ability of courts to seal
47 settlement records in cases
that involve issues of public safety.1
The impulse to limit the sealing of court records and
settlement information in cases involving issues of public concern
is a sound one. Before state and federal legislators adopt new
legislation to limit or eliminate judicial discretion over closure of
court records, however, those legislators should examine the
degree to which existing "good cause" requirements (in
conjunction with judicial education) sufficiently address the
concern about secret settlements or the excessive use of sealing.1
The question here, as with policy development regarding Internet
access to public court records, is whether existing structures,
which balance competing interests in permitting or limiting
public access, should be examined and improved upon before the
legislators (or courts) impose new rules. 49
146. See Dore, supra note 143, at 792-93.
147. See Spainhour, supra note 143, at 2156-57 ("Nearly twenty states now have
laws affecting settlement confidentiality in varying forms and degrees. The trend
toward addressing hidden dangers in litigation documents continues.").
148. As Arthur Miller notes, FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) and state counterparts contain a
"good cause" requirement prior to the issuance of protective orders. Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV.
427, 467 (1991) (arguing that laws prohibiting secret settlements "impose a
superfluous and inordinate work burden on the courts"). The requirement of a "good
cause" showing, effectively enforced, may be sufficient to address the concerns about
secret settlements without going too far in tying judges' hands. See also George
Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience Under
Uniform Rule 216.1 and The Rule's Future in a World of Electronic Filing, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 1089 (2003) (making similar arguments regarding New York's rule requiring a
"good cause" showing before court case records may be sealed).
149. See, e.g., Joseph D. Steinfeld, Eve Burton, et al., Recent Developments in The
Law of Access, 726 PLI/Pat 7, 52-53 (2002) ("When should the identities of persons
involved in [clergy sexual abuse] cases be kept secret? ... To answer this question,
the court used a good cause impoundment analysis, identifying as critical factors the
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To the extent that efforts to prevent courts from exercising
broad discretion to seal court records might appear to be on a
collision course with proposals to limit public access to private or
sensitive information contained in court records, a few points are
worth noting. First, both impulses are based on the interest in
ensuring public access to information that serves the interests for
which public access is required: to inform and educate the public
about the workings of the courts, and as a mechanism for
oversight and accountability. Judges and court policy-makers,
seeking to balance public access with competing interests must
bear in mind not only individual interests in privacy and security,
but also the effect of their actions on the sound administration of
justice. In the context of sealing records, there are those who
have argued that, if certain civil cases in which the parties seek
to preclude public access are kept open to public scrutiny, certain
litigants' interests will be impaired so that litigants may resort to
private fora rather than the public court system to resolve
disputes.
On the other hand, others argue that once people avail
themselves of the court system to resolve disputes, they have
acquiesced to having the dispute resolved in a public forum, that
is, to having all that
11150is revealed about them in the proceeding
exposed to the world.
Not everyone in court, however, appears
there voluntarily-people required to appear in court involuntary
may argue that they did not chose to participate in a dispute
addressed in a public forum. Because this is true for at least half
of all civil litigants (and, it is fair to say, all of those in criminal
court), courts should not glibly take the position that everyone
appearing in court acquiesces to being there and to subjecting
their disputes to public scrutiny.
At the same time, judges should be made aware that it is not
appropriate to seal a court record simply on the agreement of the
parties.
This standard regarding private agreements is
applicable when a party's personal, business, or reputational
interests are at stake, absent a showing that no public interest in
the information exists or that the litigants' competing concerns
outweigh the public interest in the information. 1 The mere
nature of the parties and their controversy; the type of information and privacy
interests involved; and the extent of the community interest.").
150. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 134, at 466.
151. See David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-SanctionedSecrecy and
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threat that litigants will go elsewhere is not enough to warrant
the wholesale sealing of records, though courts (and legislatures)
should be cognizant of the possible ancillary effects of their
actions with respect to sealing.
Second, the call to protect certain data elements, documents,
and cases, which are clearly not in the public's interest, or cases
in which there is a showing that a release would cause significant
harm to litigants, witnesses, or others, is not necessarily
inconsistent with a call to limit pro forma sealing of settlements
or of court documents upon the request of one party or the
agreement of both parties. The critical difference between much
of the information sought to be shielded in the Internet context
and the information that was shielded in the context of
complained-of secret settlements is that the former generally does
not contribute to stated interests in transparency, while the latter
does.
The difficulty for court systems lies in the fact that many
instances exist in which the subject matter of a case includes
elements of both private, sensitive information and information
arguably related to the public's interest in maintaining judicial
oversight. Some examples include: juvenile cases involving on
one hand the concern of guarding information pertaining to
minors, and on the other a competing interest in supervising the
justice system's treatment of juveniles, and medical malpractice
The Exigency of National Reform, 53 DuKE L.J. 807 (2003) (exploring "legitimacy of
court-approved secrecy in litigation" and arguing for the broadest possible public
access to all court records); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements
(Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115
(1999) (advocating amendments to American Bar Association Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.2 regarding secrecy of settlements).
152. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality
of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1183, n.234 ("Policies
on access to juvenile records pose a conflict between the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile court and the public safety interests [in] identifying career criminals"); see
also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS:
IMPLEMENTING THE CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FINAL PROJECT REPORT 30 (Oct. 15,
2005), httpJ/www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res-PriPubAccCrtRcrds-FinaRpt
.pdf. There are special issues involved in family court records that suggest that some
information be kept private regardless of their [sic] form (paper or electronic):
Sensitive information about individuals contained in the records (including
mental health and other reports);
The danger of identity theft due to high amount of personally identifiable
information contained in the records (e.g., financial statements in custody and
support filings);
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cases, in which personal medical information (normally
considered confidential), is central to the outcome of the case and
may be necessary to know in making a determination regarding
the appropriate outcome of such cases. In these circumstances,
courts are faced with very difficult choices. Some court systems
need not address these issues because certain classes of cases
such as juvenile, matrimonial, and family law cases are closed by
statute or court rule,"' Others address the tension between
public interest and privacy concerns on a more case by case
basis."4 On balance, determinations regarding when and to what
degree "good cause" exists to close a courtroom or to seal a court
document appropriately belong with the courts. 155
Viewing the question from a separation of powers and checks
and balances perspective, the judiciary, given its role as the
interpreter of the law, its supervisory power over court records,
and its responsibility for the sound administration of justice,
should retain discretion in addressing tough cases regarding
whether and when matter in court proceedings should be shielded
from public view. Should judges and court administrators fail to

The therapeutic role of the court could be challenged if participants don't trust
the security of the disclosures made there due to inadequate privacy protections;
The historical "family privacy" value in American society has some weight that
needs to be balanced here.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS:
IMPLEMENTING THE CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FINAL PROJECT REPORT at 30.
153. See, e.g., Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York by the
Commission on Public Access to Court Records supra note 3 at 20-24; Mary Jo
Brooks Hunter, 1997 Special Report: Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and
Adoption Task Force, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 165 ("Except with regard to
the records in certain juvenile offender cases, none of the records of the juvenile
courts and none of the records relating to an appeal from a non-public juvenile court
proceeding, except the written appellate opinion, are open to public inspection");
Daniel Morman & Sharon R. Bock, Electronic Access to Court Records, A Virtual
Tightrope in the Making, 78 FLA. B. J. 10 (Nov. 2004) (discussing objections of family
lawyers to placement of electronic court records on the Internet).
But see
IMPLEMENTING THE CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, supra note 149, at 32. ("While the
common historical assumption has been that dependency and delinquency
proceedings should be closed, and the court records of those proceedings similarly
unavailable to the public, this assumption has been changing in recent years .... In
only 21 jurisdictions [abuse and neglect] proceedings closed for all cases").
154. Bryan Morrison, Note, To Seal or Not to Seal? That is Still the Question:
Arkansas Best Corp. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 49 ARK. L. REV. 325, 328-29
(1996) ("Courts generally have determined that when faced with a sealing issue, no
bright line public access rule should apply; rather, the decision should be made on a
case-by-case basis.").
155. See Miller, supra note 134, at 501.
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exercise that discretion in a manner consistent with the public
interest, the threat of legislation limiting that discretion should
serve as a wake up call and perhaps ultimately an absolute
restriction. However, before such legislation is enacted, careful
consideration should be given to strengthening and clarifying
existing frameworks for156balancing access, privacy, security, and
judicial administration.
Requests to limit access to personal identifying information
in public court records posted on the Internet and requests to seal
cases where the litigants agree to keep actual and potential
public hazards confidential can be distinguished in court policies
regarding both Internet access and elaboration of the "good
cause" requirement for sealing court records.157 As noted below,
an important component of court systems' work regarding these
issues should involve judicial and public education that focuses
on the purposes for which courts and court records are presumed
open and on the particular concerns that warrant closure.
Attention also should be paid to the courts' roles in interpreting
and
law and administering justice versus the roles
both
responsibilities of the other coordinate branches. In
instances, however, existing frameworks for balancing public
access and privacy and confidentiality should be considered and
utilized (or perhaps modified) before any broad legislative or
policy requirements are added.
III. THE COMBINATION OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
SECTOR INFORMATION GATHERING, AGGREGATION,
AND DISSEMINATION IMPACT PUBLIC
ACCESS/PRVACY CONCERNS IN THE COURT
RECORDS CONTEXT
Another wrinkle complicating the debate about public access
versus privacy in the provision of Internet access to court records
156. In fact, the most useful "Sunshine laws" are those that void agreements
among private parties to keep facts relevant to maintaining public safety
confidential. See Spainhour, supra note 143. As noted above, existing requirements
of a showing of "good cause" before issuing protective or sealing orders (together with
judicial education) may be sufficient to protect against the kinds of abuses seen in
the Bridgestone/Firestone tire and priest abuse cases. See Miller, supra note 134, at
474-77, 490-501.
157. Indeed, George Carpinello discusses the operation of the "good cause"
requirement in the context of electronic access to court records, indicating that
judicial discretion within articulated bounds can best balance the tension between
access and privacy. See Carpinello, supra note 148.
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involves the role of the private sector as both a facilitator of
access and a consumer, compiler, and aggregator of the data
contained in those records. Intense private sector interest in
personal information highlights the increasing importance of
such information as a commodity. Indeed, some commentators
have noted how technology is "commodifying" personal
information and have explored the treatment of personal
information as "property.""5 The broad concern about the role
private sector information brokers play in threatening individual
privacy impacts Internet court records policy in several ways.
First, some court systems turn to the private sector for
expertise in establishing systems for providing online access to
court case records. This can raise questions about the ownership
and use of the Internet access architecture (and indeed the
records themselves). Second, some courts provide access to bulk
information and aggregated data to private sector entities for
background checks or other purposes. Often courts charge fees
for this information, raising revenue to support court technology
or the general fund. However, the sale of bulk information for
revenue enhancement can appear to detract from the courts'
obligation to provide free and open access to records and to
remain free from private sector influence in this endeavor.
Finally, private sector interest in court records data may
influence legislators and lobbyists to push courts to implement
access architecture and policies that tend to serve private
commercial interests more than the public interest in access,
transparency, and appropriate security and privacy protections.
As one commentator notes:
[olnly in the for-profit private sector are there the resources
both to produce sophisticated information and to purchase
the finished product on a commercially viable scale. Public
sector information services were once fairly widely available
on a free or low-cost basis, but in this era, market principles

158. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property,Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV.
L. REv. 2055, 2056-57 (2004):
The monetary value of personal data is large and still growing, and corporate
America is moving quickly to profit from this trend. Companies view this
information as a corporate asset and have invested heavily in software that
facilitates the collection of consumer information. Moreover, a strong conception
of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United States, and
individual Americans are already participating in the commodification of their
personal data.
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of user-pay, cost recovery, and servicing "clients" have led to
the virtual privatization of public-sector information. Even
those once-privileged bastions of state information secrecy,
the security and intelligence agencies, are flogging their
information services to the highest bidders in the private
sector. Governments increasingly post free information on
the Internet, but this is mainly for democratic legitimation of
their cost-recovery supply to the private sector: the very fact
that information is freely available is generally proof of its
relatively low value as a commodity. 159
The argument that public information is being subjected to
virtual privatization to become useful may be made with respect
to court records. Private vendors have demonstrated intense
interest in court records and indeed providers of computerized
legal research like Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw have a keen interest
in providing access to (and cornering the market for) court
records information that may be organized and aggregated
for
160
useful applications that lawyers and others will purchase.
This exacerbates concerns about the government's collection
of vast amounts of personal information in secret and explains
some of the suspicion about an offer by the government to use the
Internet to provide greater transparency regarding its records
and functions. Yet much of the reaction to proposals to provide
Internet access (and thus greater transparency with respect to
this aspect of government) has centered around the concern that
despite arguments about greater transparency, the placement of
court records on the Internet will only serve to feed the
panopticon. That is, that while only minimally enhancing public
understanding and oversight of court functions, Internet access
will do much more to facilitate both the government's and the
private sector's roles as participants in the collection,
distribution, and use of individual private information. The
159. Whitaker, supra note 112, at 71.
160. See Melissa Barr, Democracy in the Dark: Public Access Restrictions from
Westlaw and LexisNexis, 11 SEARCHER 1 (January 2003), http://www.infotoday.com/s
earcher/jan03/barr.shtml (arguing that LexisNexis and Westlaw are cornering the
market for legal research and court record information, some of which previously had
been available free of charge). In a time line summarizing 30 years of LexisNexis
activity, it is noted that in 2001, LexisNexis acquired CourtLink Corp., the leading
provider of web based services to electronically file legal documents and access and
monitor court records. LexisNexis, The LexisNexis Timeline: Celebrating
Innovation...
and
30
Years
of
Online
Legal
Research,
13,
http://www.lexisnexis.compresscenter/timeline/30thtimelinefulltxt.pdf.
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Internet has accelerated a shift in the power of the panopticon
from centralized government actors to both centralized and
decentralized private actors. Rather than the familiar model of a
single governmental Big Brother, individuals now face Big
Brother, Bigger Brother (global corporations), and a vast array of
Little Brothers and Sisters and Strangers all unseen, watching
and waiting to use the information accumulated and aggregated
for both positive and nefarious purposes.16 These observers argue
that government action which contributes to the accumulation
and aggregation of individual private or sensitive information
only makes a bad problem worse.
This sinister view of the power and perils
of the Internet
S162
pervades much scholarly and popular discourse and has had a
profound impact on the debate about finding the appropriate
balance between transparency and the protection of individual
private or sensitive information. Couple this with the notion of
ceding information control to the private sector, or worse, the
secret agglomeration of public and private information, and many
red flags go up.163
In the court records context, online access is developing in a
number of ways: some entirely managed by court systems, others
handed over to private entities, and still others operating using a
combination of the two.'r In the federal government and in many
states, court systems use their own internal systems to provide
access to court dockets and information. 6 5 Private vendors have
shown much interest in obtaining court record information to repackage and sell to clients in various forms and for various
reasons.
Indeed, private sector vendors have been actively
161. See generally ROBERT O'HARROw, JR., No PLACE TO HIDE: BEHIND THE
SCENES OF OUR EMERGING SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY, (2005) (describing how increased
surveillance capability, computer technology, and the merging of public and private
personal data collection have resulted in the collection of vast amounts of personal
information that can be used to track, assess, and predict our behavior).
162. See, e.g., Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 27; Lin supra note 66.
163. See O'HARROW, supra note 161; Whitaker, supra note 112.
164. See National Center for State Courts, Privacy and Public Access-A Tour of
the States, NCSC Electronic Filing, Privacy and Public Access Conference, Las
Vegas, NV (Dec. 2001) (presentation materials), http://www.courtaccess.org/other/co
nferences.htm; see also CCJ/COSCA Model Guidelines, supra note 135.
165. The federal courts have developed a cost-based PACER system modeled on
commercial computer access systems but belonging to the federal courts. The
PACER system requires registration and payment for downloading information
beyond a certain minimum number of pages.
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lobbying many state governments to get in on the action in online
court records. The inclusion of private vendors in the provision of
online public court records may lead to anomalous situations such
as the possibility that a private vendor establishes an electronic
court records system and then goes out of business, leaving open
a number of questions about the ownership
of the system and of
16
the information contained therein.
Certainly, private vendors' interest in the information
contained in court records highlights its market value and the
commercial interest in the collection, aggregation and use of this
data for a range of purposes including background checks and
consumer profiles as well as the secondary packaging and sale of
case searches and court information to lawyers and other
interested persons. But once again, because court records are
public documents many argue the primary concern should not be
in the provision of wider (or "jazzier") public access by private
vendors but rather should be focused on providing effective access
and avoiding circumstances under which private vendors might
seek to "privatize" and restrict access to public information.
If the information that courts have to sell is commercially
valuable, does the free provision of this information, which is
used most often to further commercial and "entertainment" (as
opposed to public education and oversight) purposes, by placing
records online for free, subsidize a growing market in the sale of
private parties' information with no remuneration for the parties?
As the number of issues around Internet access to information in
general proliferates, it is important that court systems remain
focused on the goals and purposes for which courts provide public
access to the public documents they produce and that courts
develop policies that are consistent with those purposes.
Although court systems must be cognizant of the ways in which
court record information may be used and misused, there should
also be some recognition that ancillary misuse of court records

166. Such a situation raises interesting questions regarding ownership of
information. For example, what should happen when a commercial provider of
electronic court records goes out of business? What about the litigant's or the
individual's ownership interest-is the information considered property except with
respect to the subjects? See generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Rochelle Dreyfus,
Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual
PropertyLore, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8, (1999), available at http://stlr.stanford.eduSTL
R/Symposia/Privacy/99_VS_8.
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information should not lead courts to refrain from providing
appropriate access that is consistent with the role and purposes of
the courts. Nor should courts permit the methods of and policies
for providing online access to court records to be driven by private
sector interests or pressures.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING POLICIES
THAT BALANCE THE TENSION BETWEEN PUBLIC
ACCESS AND PRIVACY IN THE COURT RECORDS
CONTEXT
The tension between providing public access to public
documents, including court records, and competing interests such
as privacy, security, trade secrets, and government interests in
efficiency and fairness, has been around for a long time. Why
then, has the access/privacy debate become so thorny for courts in
the context of Internet access to court records?
Courts-including judges, court administrators, and court
staff-do not operate in a vacuum. Concerns about Internet
privacy and security do not go unnoticed by judges and court
administrators. Indeed, the toughest questions about privacy and
security are often resolved in the courtroom. Thus, when engaged
in policy development that seeks to strike the appropriate balance
between public access and issues of privacy, security, and
effective administration, there can be an impulse to address
broader privacy problems like identity theft, stalking, and other
misuses of online information. 167 Although there is no doubt that
courts should take steps to prevent injury to litigants and to
reduce the chances that publicly available information about
them will not be misused, it is not the courts' job to foreclose
improved access to public information or to solve broader Internet
privacy and security problems. The best way to address broader
concerns like identity theft is through effective legislation and
167. See, e.g., testimony of Ken Dreifach, supra note 9 (detailing concerns about
exacerbating identity theft through online court records access).
In my own
experience working with New York State's Commission on Public Access to Court
Records, I remember that my initial approach to the project was from a privacy
protective perspective that came not only from my own concerns about Internet
privacy, but from my prior work with the New York State Attorney General on
Internet and consumer privacy protection. As I focused more closely on the role of
the courts and on the purposes and importance of public access to court records, I
began to see the importance of a more narrowly tailored court records policy that
responds to privacy concerns without trying to resolve them and without restricting
appropriate access.
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serious, consistent, and effective law enforcement. This does not
mean, however, that the courts should completely ignore the
issues raised by Internet access or refrain from developing or
modifying relevant policies.
Rather, courts must confront the policy challenges
introduced by Internet access and, consistent with their role and
cognizant of the purposes of public access, draft policies that hone
existing methods for balancing the public access/privacy,
minimize the inclusion of high risk data not essential to court
procedures, provide education about the impact of Internet access
and, to the extent feasible, address the concerns of various
stakeholders. Next, the article will briefly discuss each of these
recommendationsbelow.
A. COURTS MUST CONFRONT THE POLICY CHALLENGE RAISED
BY THE PROSPECT OF INTERNET ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS
WITH A COHERENT POLICY THAT DRAWS ON EXISTING
FRAMEWORKS AND THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER COURTS IN

STRIKING THE PUBLIC ACCESS/PRIVACY BALANCE

Contrary to the view of proponents of total unfettered access
to court records, there is a necessary and meaningful role for
court policymakers in balancing public access with privacy,
security, and effective court administration. While court policies
are incapable of solving broader problems wrought by the
Internet, and should not try to do so. Courts can and should,
however, review and modify their policies to ensure that
information included in court records, by request, habit, or
requirement, is protected from needless risks.'6s Ideally, given
the ease with which private entities may scan and publish over
the Internet paper records, this review should address paper as
well as electronic records. Even those courts that decide not to
place case records on the Internet but to limit online access to
168. One recommended approach is that courts review the information that is
routinely requested of litigants to ensure that it is necessary. For example, Florida's
Committee on Privacy and Court Records stated in a recent draft reported that:
The Committee has concluded that Florida court files commonly contain
information which is not required by law or rule and which is not needed by the
court for purposes adjudication or case management... . The Committee makes
a series of recommendations intended to substantially minimize the inclusion of
such extraneous personal information in court records.
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS, REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATIONS DRAFT 31 (May 6, 2005), httpJ/www.floridasupremecourt

.org/pub-info/documents/05-06-2005_DraftReportCourtRecords.pdf.
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docket information should consider reviewing and revising
privacy/security policies regarding information in paper records.
Many private companies already provide easy access to case
records and may begin placing records online if courts decline to
do so. Therefore, whether court systems systematically place
court records online or not, courts should be cognizant of the
potential for broad public access to all public case records and
should implement appropriate guidelines regarding "public" and
"non-public" information in all court records.
For example,
court policymakers should encourage
attorneys, litigants, and judges to consider the circumstances
under which sensitive information is really necessary to resolve a
case. Such information may range from Social Security Numbers,
to detailed medical information, to sensitive personal information
in family law cases involving children. A quick scan of a sample
of records routinely filed in New York State court revealed that
court forms may request data items such as social security
numbers and dates of birth in cases in which that information
may not be used and is thus unnecessary. 169 Similarly, judges
should be wary of litigants who include sensitive personal
information or even egregious allegations in court documents as a
mechanism170 to "shame" their opponents or gain a litigation
advantage.
The most difficult task that court policymakers face is how
best to identify and address matters that should be dealt with
systemically from the kinds of issues that are best resolved on a
case-by-case basis. Because of the array of circumstances under
which sensitive information may appear in court records, in many
instances judges will have to resolve the tensions between access
and privacy on a case by case basis. A case by case approach is
the only way to ensure that access decisions are to be neither
169. For example, a research assistant searching New York paper court records in
a Bronx courthouse easily obtained copies of a death certificate containing details
including the date of birth, Social Security number, address, marital status, parents'
names, as well as a copy of an authorization to disclose a deceased person's medical
records, which included name, address, date of birth, date of death, and Social
Security number. (Documents on file with the author.) While some of this
information may be necessary given the purpose for which the document is prepared,
a re-examination of the nature of the "public" information in the document is
warranted.
170. See Michael Caughey, Keeping Attorneys From Trashing Identities:
Malpractice as Backstop for Clients Under the United States Judicial Conference's
Policy on Electronic CourtRecords, 79 WASH. L. REV. 407 (2004).
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over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.'7 1 For this purpose, many
existing frameworks, like the "good cause" requirement
prior to
172
sealing court case files, may operate fairly well.
Courts should establish general policies to guide judges,
attorneys, litigants, and administrative personnel as case records
go online and should implement a streamlined process for
eliminating from public view information that is clearly not in the
public interest and that presents risks to litigants, witnesses and
others.
Given the importance of public access and the
identification of high risk data elements for purposes of
individual privacy and security discussed above, court policies
regarding public access to court records should focus narrowly on
redacting or eliminating data elements that pose the greatest
risks to individuals and do not serve the public's interest in
judicial oversight and accountability.
Some observers argue that the access/privacy tension can be
resolved through the use of technology, including the use of
computer programs to redact sensitive data elements or to
anonymize information so that individual privacy is protected
where bulk or aggregated data is disseminated. 17 In addition,
171. The case by case approach is well established, and is applied to resolve access
issues in a variety of contexts. For example, the court in United States v. Moussaoui,
65 Fed. Appx. 881, 887-88 (4th Cir. 2003), describes its method for determining the
redaction of pleadings in a terrorism case:
Our practice with respect to a pleading by Moussaoui is as follows. [citations
omitted] The pleading is initially filed under seal to provide the Government an
opportunity to submit proposed redactions. [The motion to redact is placed in the
public file, but the proposed redactions are kept under seal]. Intervenors do not
contest the adequacy of this procedure, and we decline to alter it. Redaction of
Moussaoui's pleadings is necessary to omit irrelevant and inflammatory
material and to prevent Moussaoui from attempting to communicate certain
information to others [citations omitted]. The interest of the public in the flow of
information is protected by our exercising independent judgment concerning
redactions.
Id.; see also Securities and Exchange Commission v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222,
231 (2d Cir. 2001) ("With respect to all judicial documents, however, we held that, 'it
is proper for a district court after weighing competing interests, to edit and redact a
judicial document in order to allow access to appropriate portions of the
document ....').

172. See, e.g., Carpinello, supra note 148, at 1123.
173. See Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems
and the Question of Public Access to Court Records Over the Internet, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 175 (2004). Silverman argued:
The same technology that heralds unprecedented public access at minimum cost
and maximum ease also enables an automated intelligence that is capable of
understanding and processing data in sophisticated and nuanced ways ....This
technology - Extensible Markup Language (XML) and its family of related
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there are those who argue that concerns about the harvesting and
aggregation of online information can be minimized through
technology that can make case records available one at a time but
not in the aggregate and that requires a form of "prove-you-arehuman log-in74 procedure" to prevent automated harvesting of
information. 1
While technology may help, the tougher work for courts is in
developing policies to ensure the most effective use of technology
to achieve the appropriate balance between access, privacy, and
security. As one commentator notes:
The policy challenge is to determine the rules and procedures
governing the [privacy] divide, and the technical challenge is
to build in technical features to execute or enforce those rules
and to manage accountability. The overall architecture must
include organizational, procedural, and technical features in
a framework that integrates 15 these control requirements
within business process needs.

To meet this challenge, courts should obtain input from a
range of court users while keeping in mind the particular role of
the courts both generally and with respect to the provision of
records access.

browsers, parsers, processors, and standards - permits information in court
records to be shared with the public at the courthouse and over the Internet
while respecting the legitimate privacy interests of litigants and others who
come before our courts.
Silverman, supra note 173; see also K. A. Taipale, Technology, Security and Privacy:
The Fearof Frankenstein,The Mythology of Privacy, and the Lessons of King Ludd, 7
YALE J.L.& TECH. 123, (2005) ("[D]isaggregating privacy into identity and behavior
for analytic purposes, and designing technical systems to help manage the
circumstances of attribution, can help achieve a practical resolution to the apparent
conflict between privacy-security interests."); Shawn C. Helms, TranslatingPrivacy
Values With Technology, 7 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 288 (2001) (encouraging the use of
and development of market support for privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) as a
mechanism superior to external rules for protecting online privacy).
174. See HON PAUL. H. ANDERSON, CHAIR, FINAL REPORT/RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PUBLIC
ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 14-15. (June 28, 2004),
http://www.courts.state.mn.us/cio/public-notices/accessreport.htm (last visited June
21, 2005) ("[The committee considered technology that would attempt to make
preconviction court records accessible in some way via the Internet but less
susceptible to automated harvesting by commercial data brokers").
175. Taipale, supra note 173, at 192.
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B. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT COURTS INCLUDE STAKEHOLDERS
IN THE POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND LEARN FROM THE
EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COURT SYSTEMS

The experience thus far with court access policies on the
federal and state levels has shown that an essential step in
developing court policies regarding Internet access (and public
access generally) is to involve stakeholders including attorneys,
litigants, judges,
advocates,
representatives
of various
constituencies, and the general public.
For most court systems,
this policy development has not been easy. The Maryland court
system went through two rounds of policy development (including
significant public input) before issuing policy guidelines
addressing online case record access.177 The Florida courts have
gone through an involved policy development process that began
with some clerks placing court records online wholesale, which
was followed by a complete moratorium on Internet access to
court records. 78 A number of state court systems have spent
several years considering, developing, piloting, and implementing
179
court records access policies.
On the federal level and in many
176. Indeed, the drafters of the CCJ/COSCA Model Guidelines on Public Access to
Court Records stressed the importance of broad public outreach and the inclusion of
various points of view in developing court records access policies, noting its
importance as part of their own policy making process:
Our "process" was involved but necessary in order to produce the intricate
CCJ/COSCA Guidelines product. Inviting, welcoming, incorporating, and
facilitating continued participation from a range of individuals and perspectives,
using similar mechanisms may be our primary recommendation to states and
jurisdictions that wish to use these CCJ/COSCA Guidelines as a starting point
for their own deliberations.
Include a range of opinions. Facilitate the
discussion. Work to obtain a compromise and acknowledge with respect those
areas where compromise just is not possible. The resulting product will be
richer, and the professional relationships that are built will be essential in
implementing rules and routines to both ensure privacy and promote access to
state court records.
Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135.
177. See FINAL REPORT OF THE [MARYLAND] COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO COURT

RECORDS, 2 (March 2002), http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/finalreport3-02.pdf;
see also, [Maryland] Committee on Access to Court Records, Summary of April 23,
2001 Meeting, http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/meeting4-01.pdf (describing the
establishment of a preliminary committee, the preparation of a draft report, and the
establishment of a second, larger policymaking committee).
178. See Supreme Court of Florida, Press Release: Supreme Court Adopts Policy to
Protect Privacy in Court Records, (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.courtaccess.org/states/
flldocuments/fl-pr-privacytrecl 1-25-2003.pdf (announcing establishment of statewide
Committee on Privacy and Court Records and noting earlier policy work and public
complaints about the placement of certain court records on electronic distribution
networks).
179. See Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135.

424

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 51

states, court policymakers established a fairly involved process
for public input prior to drafting Internet access policies.'80 The
public process played an important role in educating both the
public and the courts about the possible implications of placing
court case records online. For example, courts received testimony
regarding the potential detrimental effect of Internet access to
court records in the contexts of identity theft, domestic violence
cases, employment relationships, matrimonial
and family law
8
'
cases, and general snooping on individuals.
The myriad general concerns raised about the Internet have
made it difficult to identify optimal policy solutions for balancing
access and privacy in court records. This difficulty stems less
from the particular issues raised in the court records context and
more from generalized Internet concerns like identity theft,
stalking, and the worldwide airing of matters considered personal
and private. When court policymakers try to grapple directly
with these broader issues, their goals can become diffuse and
appropriate solutions may seem unattainable. As the policy
process in many state courts demonstrates, it takes much
discussion over time for policymakers to identify and clarify the
boundaries between broader Internet concerns and the more
particularized
issues that should drive court records access
•. • 182
policies.
It is not hard to imagine why. Over the last few
months, for example, there have been several reports of
unprecedented breaches of online security resulting in the release
of sensitive information, such as Social Security and account
numbers of many thousands of individuals which raises the

180. See, e.g., Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135; Deyling, supra note 147, at 1.
181. Courts also received testimony about the benefits of online access to court
records for media access, background checks, and public education about the courts.
See, e.g., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 3, at Exhibit 3.

182. For example, the recent report of the Florida Committee on Privacy and Court
Records explicitly recognized the difficulty Committee members had in reaching
consensus:
The breadth and complexity of the subject under study is such that intelligent,
reasonable people can and do reach different conclusions about law and policy.
Indeed, public input to the Committee includes passionate, articulate arguments
on a number of sub-issues. It should therefore not be surprising that the
Committee could not reach consensus on several major issues, indeed it would be
remarkable if it did.
Jon Mills, Chair, Committee on Privacy and Court Records, Supreme Court of
Florida, Final Report of the Committee on Privacy and Court Records (August 16,
2005) at 4.
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specter of mass identity theft.183 The concern that making court
records available online will exacerbate these problems and
possibly do so with an apparent government stamp of approval
resonates with many court policymakers. Current legislative
proposals make reference to public records and the interplay
between government and private data collectors as issues to be
considered when seeking
to protect individuals from the misuse of
184
their personal data.
In addition, the issues and questions raised in connection
with Internet access to court records (and in the context of the
"secret settlement" debate) warrant a re-assessment of current
access policies in both real space and cyberspace.1 8 The deluge of
concerns unearthed during public hearings and public comment
186
periods gave many court policy makers pause.
183. See recent reports of data theft of records of ChoicePoint, LexisNexis and
others, supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
184. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection (Version 2.0) GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper(April 5, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=699701 (proposing a model privacy regime based on the
principles of notice, consent, control, and access, including regulation of "access and
uses of public records that maximizes exposure of government activites and
minimizes the disclosure of personal information about individuals").
185. One aspect of the Internet access policy debate on both the federal and state
levels involves whether paper and electronic versions of court records should be
treated differently (generally with greater redaction of electronic records) or whether
the only distinction should be between public and nonpublic information regardless
of the record's form The general consensus appears to be that a "public is public"
court records policy makes most sense.
This, in turn, supports a general
reconsideration of the data elements requested and permitted in public court records.
See Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135, at 22. "These CCJ/COSCA Guidelines apply
to all court records regardless of the physical form of the court record, the method of
recording the information in the court record or the method of storage of the
information in the court record." Id.
186. Policy development in this area has tended to be relatively slow and
deliberate, due in part to the range of concerns raised by stakeholders and in part to
institutional limitations that range from technological expertise to staffing concerns.
See, e.g., PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINN. SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM.
ON RULES OF PUB. ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE JUDICIARY, REP. FOR PUB. COMMENT,
IN RE: SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF PUB. ACCESS TO RECORDS OF THE JUD.

BRANCH, 9-10 (January 21, 2004). The Report stated:
The advisory committee's preliminary recommendation on Internet access
should be viewed as the first step ina go-slow approach to providing more
remote access to information. As indicated above, courts that have simply begun
posting all public records on the Internet have encountered numerous problems
and have had to pull back and reconsider their policy in light of privacy concerns
raised by persons identified in the records. The committee agreeed that the
potential for damage to individuals necessitates a careful approach.
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As more and more court systems are realizing, the answer to
the complex questions raised by Internet access is not to refrain
from placing court records online.
Nor is it to avoid the
development of policies addressing public access to court records
by allowing policy to develop by default. Court policymakers
must recognize that the focus of any across-the-board policy is
necessarily limited given the courts' obligation to provide access
and the fact that many of the problems articulated regarding
Internet access are beyond the scope of the courts' role.
C. COURT RECORDS ACCESS POLICIES MUST RESPECT THE
UNIQUE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN OUR SYSTEM OF SEPARATED

POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

Courts and judges must craft policies that are consistent
with the judiciary's role in our tripartite system of separated
powers and checks and balances. 187 Judges and court
administrators must be clear about the purposes and boundaries
187. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Spurlock v. FBI, regarding the parameters of a
federal court's authority to make determinations regarding access to records:
A district court possesses inherent power over the administration of its business.
It has inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before
it, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d
27 (1991), to promulgate and enforce rules for the management of litigation,
Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146, 106 S.Ct. 466, 470, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), to
punish contempt, Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 793, 107 S.Ct. 2124,
2130, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987), and to remand cases involving pendent claims.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357, 108 S.Ct. 614, 622, 98
L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). A federal court's inherent authority to manage its docket
and maintain proper decorum does not authorize it to carve out exceptions to the
FOIA remedies expressly provided by Congress.
Spurlock, 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1995). Although there is some clear
delineation of the respective powers of the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive, there is also a great deal of interdependence and overlap among the three
branches of government. For example, as the court noted in Stillman v. Dept. of
Defense:
In Nixon 11, the Court rejected the government's argument for "three airtight
departments" of government as "archaic." 433 U.S. at 441-44, 97 S.Ct. 2777. The
Court has instead consistently embraced the view articulated by Justice Jackson
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. 343 U.S.
at 635, 72 S.Ct. 863 (Jackson, J., concurring). In Mistretta, the Court explained,
the Constitution "imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping
responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of
which 'would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself
effectively.' " 488 U.S. at 381, 109 S.Ct. 647. Indeed, separation of powers
principles do not mean that the branches of government "ought to have no
partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other."
Stillman, 209 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205 (D.D.C. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, Stillman v.
C.I.A., 319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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of their policy work. As courts develop policies to address
Internet access to court records, it is important that they keep
specific focus on the role of the courts versus other branches. To
the extent that broader problems related to the Internet's effect
on privacy and security affect court administration, court leaders
should resist the urge to address them through court policies and
should instead encourage lawmakers and law enforcement
officials to address them. To the extent that the current legal
patchwork of privacy protections is not well equipped to address
the reality of the Internet's capacity for intrusion into an
individual's private realm and such intrusion affects court
functions, court leaders should alert legislators to the particular
concerns that arise in the court records context. But again, this
does not mean that courts need not develop and implement their
own policies to address these concerns within an appropriate
framework.
D. COURT RECORDS ACCESS POLICIES SHOULD BEGIN WITH
EXISTING COURT RECORD CLOSURE RULES AND CONSIDER
WHETHER THOSE RULES SUFFICE OR SHOULD BE ADAPTED OR
AMENDED N LIGHT OF INTERNET ACCESS

The judicial branch, while remaining focused on its role as
distinct from the roles of the other branches in addressing
tensions among privacy, access, and security in the Internet
context, should draw upon existing rules and the well-developed
experience of balancing access and privacy tensions in other
contexts. The goal with respect to court records is to provide
broad access to relevant information at little or no cost to the
public. This means access to information that is appropriate for
public information, education, and oversight purposes. At the
same time, courts must remain cognizant of individual privacy
and safety concerns in cyberspace. Courts must have concerns
about government transparency
and public
access to
quintessentially public information as well as concerns about
court management and the effective administration of justice. To
a great extent, these are the same concerns that courts deal with
every day under rules regarding requests to seal records or to
close courtrooms; they are the same concerns that come up with
protective order and FOIL requests. 18 8 The approaches taken and
188. This is not to say that these issues, even in the context of existing frameworks,
are easily resolved. For example, while court records are generally exempt from
their state's freedom of information laws, in some states those laws still implicate
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the tools used to resolve these tensions should not be forgotten or
abandoned simply because the method of access is the Internet.
As noted above, there exist, on the federal level and in many
states, rules regarding protective orders or requests to seal court
documents that may suffice to keep matter that should not be
made public out of court records, while requiring a sufficient
showing to avoid wholesale closure of records that should remain
open. Before imposing new rules or policies, judges and court
policymakers should satisfy themselves that existing frameworks
cannot effectively address the task. 9
how courts balance records access against competing concerns, often with
complicated results. As noted in a November 1, 2004 Memorandum to Florida's
Committee on Privacy & Court Records from the Media and Communications Law
Committee of the Florida Bar, "[olne issue that has arisen is whether the hundreds of
exemptions to Florida's Public Records Act also apply to court records, after the
Buenano decision" (Buenano,in dictum, raised the possibility that the exemptions to
disclosure in Florida's public records act might apply to court records).
Memorandum from the Media & Communications Law Comm. Of the Fla. Bar to the
Fla. Comm. On Privacy & Ct. Records (Nov. 1, 2004) (on file with author). Noting
that the "Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that access to adjudicatory
records of the judicial branch is not governed by [the public records act] because the
latter applies only to records of the state's agencies and does not include the judicial
branch," the memo goes on to say that "a mechanism exists to protect records, or
portions of records, when concerns arise. Id. Parties can request closure of court
documents when a compelling interest exists in a given case." Id. In the
memorandum, the Media and Communications Law Committee also notes practical
problems with automatically applying public records act exemptions to court records:
"Applying each exemption... to court records would create an administrative
quagmire and be virtually impossible to administer ....Certainly, clerks cannot be
responsible for culling through all the hundreds of weekly court filings per circuit for
the possible application of about 700 exemptions to each document." Id. The Florida
discussion provides just one example of the many difficulties court administrators
face in applying existing policies and frameworks to the prospect of Internet access to
court records, in addition to considering the development of new policies.
189. Current proposed E-Government Act amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure take this approach. The
proposed amendments begin with existing rules for filing and sealing of court records
and provide for the redaction of social security numbers (to the last four digits), the
names of minors (to initials), birth dates (to year of birth), and financial account
numbers (to the last four digits), while providing flexibility for courts to address
particular or novel issues that may arise in the context of public access versus
privacy/security. As noted in the introductory statement for E-Government Rules to
be released for public comment:
These rules are intended to implement the requirements of the E-Government
Act and also the established Judicial Conference policy concerning privacy
protection for court filings. But no rule can adequately foresee developments in
technology and rights of access to information, especially given the difficult
policy choices that have to be made among 1) protection of privacy interests, 2)
individual rights to notice and opportunity to be heard, and 3) public access to
court filing. This rule only intends to provide flexibility. It necessarily relies on
the responsibility of courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether to
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Courts also should draw upon experience thus far with
different methods for addressing Internet concerns. For example,
the most effective legislative approaches to protecting Internet
privacy have been those that affirmatively place information
about data uses and abuses in the hands of data subjects.' 90
Unlike ECPA and other laws and regulations focused on
particular forms of data transfer, laws that require notification to
data subjects more effectively address Internet privacy and
security concerns.
Experience has also shown that more
legislation is not necessarily better. Consider the many laws
currently on the books that have failed to address the most
serious concerns about Internet privacy and security. Similarly,
in the court records context, enacting more rules or providing less
access may not best achieve the goal of balancing access and
privacy. Before proposing new rules, courts should examine
existing balancing frameworks and consider whether, either in
their current form or with amendments, those frameworks can
serve to address the Internet access/privacy tension.

E. COURT RECORDS ACCESS POLICIES SHOULD IDENTIFY AND
REMOVE FROM PUBLIC VIEW HIGH RISK DATA ELEMENTS THAT
DO NOT SERVE THE PURPOSES OF PUBLIC ACCESS
To the extent that particular classes of data are deemed not
relevant for public purposes or are found to pose too great a risk
to safety or security, a policy decision to exclude those elements
wholesale may be appropriate. A policy approach that targets
only the highest risk data elements for exclusion from court
documents while maintaining the existing discretionary
balancing scheme that allows judges to determine more complex
cases is reasonable and appropriate. This approach allows courts
to target information implicating widespread and high risk
privacy concerns (like the dissemination of Social Security
numbers) and also to address, case-by-case, more particularized
issues in sensitive cases-maintaining transparency in most
dispense with privacy protections or instead to provide greater protection for
private information, as the circumstances require.
Judicial Conference of the United States, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, Bankruptcy,
Civil, and Criminal Procedure (August 2005), availableat http'//www.uscourts.gov/ru
les/newrulesl.html.
190. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing California Legislation
which requires the notification of data breaches to data subjects and the resulting
public notification of the Choice Point, MasterCard and other data breaches).
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cases.
For example, the federal courts and New York state courts
have opted for a narrow policy that applies equally to paper and
electronic records and that identifies a small number of data
elements to be excluded from (or shortened in) court case records:
Social Security numbers, dates of birth, names of minor children,
and financial account numbers.19 ' These policies treat paper and
electronic records in the same manner' 9 and rely to a great extent
upon existing statutory or rule-based restrictions on access to
certain classes of records,'9 as well as on the court's inherent
power to control access to court records subject to a showing of

"good cause."

194

Different states have developed policies that vary with
respect to both the degree of access provided and the level of
detail regarding classes of information that are either
191. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF N.Y. 7-8 (N.Y. 2004), http://www.courts.slate.ny.us/i/

publicaccess/report-publicaccess-courtrecords.pdf.
192. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS
6 (Md. 2002), http://www.courts.state.md.us/access/finalreport3-02.pdf (noting that
"[a]ccess should be the same whether the record is in paper or electronic form").
193. For example, the report of New York's Commission on Public Access to Court
Records refers to existing exemptions to the presumption of openness:
Section 4 of the Judiciary Law grants the court discretion to exclude the public
in certain classes of cases: 'in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce,
seduction, abortion, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy
or filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who
are not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of
the court.
Supra note 191, at 19. The report goes on to note that the "right to inspect and copy
court records has also been limited by numerous statutes" including sections of the
Family Court Act, Domestic Relations Law, and Criminal Procedure Law, and a
variety of statutes limited access to court case records to "records in a sex offense
case that might identify the victim... grand jury minutes... probation reports and
pre-sentence memoranda ... records that identify jurors.., mental health
records ...

orders of commitment of mentally ill inmates ...

records of adoption

proceedings ... habeas corpus proceedings for a child detained by a parent...
certain proceedings... concerning venereal disease, and... concerning HIV-related
information." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., supra note 191, at 20-24.

194. "[T]he inherent power of courts to control the records of their own proceedings
has long been recognized in New York .... [Tihis power does not depend on
statutory grant but exists independently and 'inheres in the very constitution of the
court' ....

"

Id. at 19; see also Carpinello, supra note 148, at 1091-93 (discussing the

function of New York Rule of Court 216.1, which sets forth a "good cause"
requirement prior to a court's sealing a case record in the context of electronic
records).
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categorically made public or restricted from public access. Some
states have declined to place actual case records online and, at
least initially, have decided to provide Internet access to docket
information only. For example, the July 26, 2001 Report of the
Supreme Judicial Court Web Advisory Board of Massachusetts
stated: "As a first phase of dissemination of records on the web,
the trial courts should confine themselves to dockets. This will
serve the function of a bulletin board which announces the
existence and status of cases that have been lodged. Access to the
actual documents, e.g., complaints, motions, and affidavits,
involves a second phase of dissemination."1 95 Indiana's policy
provides for remote electronic access to "(1) litigant/party indexes
to cases filed with the court; (2) listings of new case filings,
including the names of the parties; (3) the chronological case
summary of cases; (4) calendars or dockets of court proceedings,
including case numbers and captions, date and time of hearings,
and location of hearings; (5) judgments, orders, or decrees."19 6 The
amended access rule also treats paper and electronic case records
equally and specifies several categories of excluded information,
including: information excluded by federal law and Indiana
statute or other court rule,
(c) Information excluded from public access by specific court
order; (d) Social Security Numbers; (e) Addresses, phone
numbers, dates of birth and other information which tends to
explicitly identify: (i) natural persons who are witnesses or
victims (not including defendants) in criminal, domestic
violence, stalking, sexual assault, juvenile, or civil protection
order proceedings; (ii) places of residence of judicial officers,
clerks and other employees of courts and clerks of court. (f)
Account numbers of specific assets, liabilities, accounts,
credit cards, and personal identification numbers (PINs); (g)
All orders of expungement entered in criminal or juvenile
proceedings; (h) All personal notes and e-mail, and
deliberative material, of judges, jurors, court staff and
judicial agencies, and information recorded in personal data

195. REPORT OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT WEB ADVISORY BOARD TO THE

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 2 (Mass. 2001), http://www.courtroom

21.net/reference/pdfs/massachusetts.pdf.
196. Task Force on Access to Court Records, Proposed Revision of Indiana
Administrative Rule 9(E) 5, http://www.courtroom21.net/privacy/files/Indiana-adop
ted.pdf.
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19 7
assistants (PDA's) or organizers and personal calendars.

Thus, even some courts that have not committed to placing
the full text of case records online have reconsidered court records
access policies given the technological ease with which such
records may be made broadly available. Indiana's policy, like
many others, sets forth specific items for exclusion from public
court case records in addition to those already excluded by law,
rule, or specific court order.
Some states, like Florida, which have very strong sunshine
laws, enacted legislation providing for online public access to
electronic records within a specified time period. The legislation
required that clerks of court provide indexes of "official records"
online'" (In Florida, "official records" does not include court case
records but includes final judgments.'9 9). Although the law was
silent with regard to court records, in 2000 some elected clerks of
200
court began posting court case records online. In 2001, Florida's
Judicial Management Council took up the issue, noted that the
Supreme Court has administrative authority over court records,
and recommended that it create a statewide policy. 2°1 Partly in
response to public outcry about the release of sensitive
information in certain case records posted online, the Florida
Supreme Court issued a moratorium on electronic public access
to
S• 202
court records pending the development of an access policy. In
2002, the Governor signed legislation appointing a study
committee on public records and restricting Internet access to
records in juvenile, family, and probate cases.
Florida's
Committee on Privacy and Court Records issued its Final Report
in August 2005. 203
The Report "contains twenty four
204
recommendations organized into three groups.
Some of the
197. Task Force on Access to Court Records, supra note 196, at 8-9.
198. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT COUNCIL ON PRIVACY &
ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 15 (Fla. 2001), http://www.floridasupremec
ourt.org/decisions/probin/scO2-659.pdf.
199. Id.

200. Id. at 20.
201. Id. at 3-4.
202. Id. at 5; see also Jason Krause, FloridaCourt Orders Records Offline: Privacy
Concerns Prompt Ruling in the Sunshine Law State, 3 No. 1 A.B.A. J.E-REPORT 2
(Jan. 9, 2004).
203. COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON PRIVACY AND CT. RECORDS (August 16, 2005), http://www.flcourts.org/gen-public
/stratlan/privacy.shtml.
204. The first group of recommendations is described as "primary recommendations
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recommendations received the
members, but many did not."

unanimous

support

433
of

all

Notably, the Florida Committee recommended delaying the
placement of court records online until difficult questions about
structuring privacy exemptions can be worked out. In the
interim, the Committee recommended that docket information,
calendars and official court records be authorized to be made
available. The Committee recommends a systematic review of
legislation, rules, and policies related to confidentiality, privacy,
security, and court records access. It also calls for judicial and
public education regarding expanded access to information
contained in court records. The Report, which contains several
dissents, reflects the difficulty many court systems have
encountered in reconciling privacy and security concerns about
that the Committee urges be initiated in a short timeframe." Supra note 23. Here,
the Committee "recommends that the Florida Legislature and the national Congress
enact meaningful privacy reforms consistent with the First Amendment that
effectively protect the informational privacy interests of citizens." Id. at 46. The
Committee further recommends that the Supreme Court reduce the scope of
confidentiality under existing court rules to expand public access to court records;
that ongoing education and appropriate public notices be provided regarding the
consequences of broad public access to court records; that there should be greater
coordination and oversight of court records policies; and that interim policy allowing
court jurisdictions to make certain court records (such as dockets, official court
records, court schedules and calendars, and traffic court records) available
electronically while a more detailed court records policy is developed. COMM. ON
PRIVACY AND CT. RECORDS, FINAL REPORT. OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND

COURT RECORDS, supra note 203 at 47-51.
The second group of recommendations "presents a series of recommendations
designed to minimize the unnecessary introduction of personal information into court
records." Id. at 44. In this group of recommendations, the Committee calls for a
systematic review of court rules and approved forms to reduce or eliminate the
inclusion of unnecessary personal information in court records; the development of a
policy to exclude the publication of extraneous personal information; and the
exclusion of discovery information from court filings except for good cause. Id. at 5355.
The third group of recommendations "provides a framework for a system of
electronic access." Id. at 45. These recommendations begin with the recognition that
electronic access to public court records supports efficiency and accountability goals
and recommend a revision of court rules to allow remote electronic access to court
records following a review and determination regarding how best to address
privacy/security/confidentiality issues and statutory exemptions to public access. Id.
at 57-61. The recommendations also call for operational guidelines to assist court
users regarding confidential information in court files. Id. at 62. The Committee
recommendations place the responsibility for protecting confidential information
with filers and court clerks. Id. at 64-66. The Committee finds that the "ultimate
authority to protect confidential information in court records belongs to the court."
Id. at 65.
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information in court records with the interest in broad public
access.
Several courts have issued reports and/or recommendations,
or have enacted rules or legislation addressing public access to
court records. The federal courts, and state courts in New York,
Maryland, California, and other states are moving forward with
the placement of full court case records online (though several
begin by placing only docket information online). Many have
taken a restrained, targeted approach to restricting access to
sensitive information.
The list of data elements categorically excluded from case
records varies from state to state, depending to some extent on
the degree to which case records are being made available and
the extent to which a particular state precludes public access to
certain categories of cases and information. As noted above, some
courts have identified a very limited number of items to be
excluded from public access.
Others have developed more
extensive lists.
The CCJ/COSCA Guidelines set forth an
extensive
list of possible items to be excluded from public
205
access. State court policies drafted thus far vary with respect to
the precise data elements excluded from public access.
To a great extent, the federal courts, New York, Indiana, and
courts in other states that exclude whole classes of sensitive cases
like matrimonial, adoption, juvenile, and family law cases from
public access, have fewer problems to solve than courts that
206
permit public access to these kinds of cases.
Some of the
205. See Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135, at 45-49.
206. New York law has long provided that many classes of cases are closed to
public access, including records in family court proceedings, certain files in
matrimonial actions, records sealed pursuant to statute such as criminal cases that
terminated in favor of the accused, or involving youthful offenders, among others.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS TO THE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF N.Y., supra note 191, at 20-26. The federal courts'

jurisdiction generally does not include cases like family and matrimonial in which
sensitive personal information is implicated, and federal courts hear fewer cases
involving medical issues such as personal injury or malpractice matters. Id. at 2526. However, concerns were raised about public access to sensitive personal
information in bankruptcy cases, which are required by statute to be publicly
accessible under 11 U.S.C. §107. Id. at 56-57; see also Office of Justice Programs of
the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in
the Federal Courts (1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/privacyn.pdf (recognizing the
need to review judiciary policies in the context of new technology). Section 107 has
been amended to provide that "[t]he bankruptcy court, for cause, may protect an
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thorniest questions surrounding online access involve issues such
as domestic violence and stalking, bitter matrimonial disputes,
and cases involving children. These are cases that clearly involve
sensitive matter but that also call for public oversight. Many of
the tensions involved in these kinds of cases can only be
addressed through education and experience with the
consequences of online access.
F. COURTS SHOULD AFFIRMATiVELY AND AGGRESSIVELY
EDUCATE THE BENCH, THE BAR AND THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNET ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS

An important element in reaching the goals of online access
to court records while avoiding identified perils is affirmative,
appropriate education of judges, court personnel, attorneys, and
the public. This is an element which was included in the
CCJ/COSCA Model Guidelines on Privacy and Public Access to
207
Court Records but has received relatively little attention thus
far in the policy making process (though it has been mentioned by
several• . courts
as a component of their court records access
2081
policies).
Just as legislation requiring companies to inform
data subjects about the use (and potential misuse) of their
personal information has proven effective in combating identity
theft and other misuses of personal information, education can
play a critically important role in addressing the concerns raised
individual, with respect to [certain types of information] to the extent the court finds
that disclosure of such information would create undue risk of identity theft or other
unlawful injury to the individual or the individual's property." Bankr. Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Prot. Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, sec. 234(a), 11 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2005).
207. Steketee & Carlson, supra note 135, at 64-69. Section 8.00 of the Guidelines
addresses the "Obligation of the Court to Inform and Educate" and includes reference
to providing information to litigants, judges, court personnel, and the public about
access to information in court records, and education about the process to change
inaccurate information in a court record. Id.
208. See, e.g., Final Report Recommendation Three 48 (Fla. 2005), http://www.flcou
rts.org/gen-public/stratplan/bin/public-comment.pdf. The report states:
Notice and Education Regarding Personal Information. Attorneys and the
general public are not sufficiently aware of the loss of privacy that can occur due
to the inclusion of personal information in a court file. The Supreme Court
should direct that ongoing education be undertaken and appropriate public
notices be provided regarding the loss of privacy and its consequences that can
occur due to the unnecessary filing of personal information in court records.
Id. (recommending that "the Supreme Court direct that continuing legal education
requirements for attorneys and judges include education on the privacy implications
of the inclusion of personal information in court records and the duty to protect the
privacy interests of clients").
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in the court records context. Judicial education can help to clarify
for judges the circumstances under which restriction of access to
records is appropriate as well as circumstances under which
closure, even when agreed upon by the parties to litigation, is
inappropriate as a matter of public policy. Attorneys can be
educated regarding plans for online access to case record
information, areas of concern that may call for requests for
closure, and the procedures to be followed to seal or redact
records. The general public also should be provided information
about the potential availability of court records on the Internet
for public information purposes, the concerns that might arise for
litigants, witnesses and others involved in cases, and the
procedures for accessing cases, seeking requests to seal, and
correcting errors.
Some state courts are beginning to focus on the role of
judicial and public education in achieving the twin goals on public
access and individual privacy and safety. For the most part,
however, aside from the information that is being disseminated
as part of the public hearing process in conjunction with court
records access policy development, education remains on the back
burner despite its potential to help address some of the
difficulties presented by online court records access. Education
should be an essential component of court policy work in this
area.
CONCLUSION
Much of the policy struggle around Internet access to court
records stems from the courts' (largely unspoken) attempt to
address and respond to broader concerns about Internet privacy
that go well beyond the existence of sensitive information in court
records. The answer to these concerns is not to refrain from
placing court records online to avoid the policy questions raised.
The courts' efforts to provide some measure of control over
particularly sensitive information while providing
greater access
•
209
appropriate.
and
necessary
are
records
court
to
209. But the necessary legal and policy changes should not begin and end with the
courts. The impetus for raising the questions about individual privacy and security
in the context of admittedly public court documents stems from broader issues of
intrusive, privacy-threatening, and often dangerous information-gathering and
aggregation that now include government, corporate, anonymous individual
aggregators.
Today's concerns about privacy in public records stem from not only from
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The careful approach that many courts are taking in
balancing privacy and security concerns with the greater public
access promised via the Internet is appropriate. It is also an
important component of the overall discourse on Internet privacy
and security and government (and corporate) transparency.
Court systems should be encouraged to use the Internet to
provide greater public access and transparency. In doing so, they
should draw upon existing tools for balancing inherent tensions
between access and privacy/security. At the same time, courts
traditional notions of government as Big Brother but also from notions of a whole
family of data mining and aggregation of vast amounts of personal information from
a combination of government and private sources. To the extent that the courts and
other government agencies contribute to the private aggregation of personal
information, government also must take responsibility for establishing a framework
within which individuals can gain control over their information. There is a need to
move beyond the patchwork of privacy protections to provide more practical ways for
individuals to exercise a measure of control over the treatment of their information.
Post 9/11 there is a greater acceptance among many members of the public
that their privacy will be compromised in the interests of national security. The USA
Patriot has demonstrates a trend in law enforcement toward diminishing both
individual privacy protections AND government transparency. The 9/11 Commission
report discusses the fact that information affecting national security is not shared
horizontally among government agencies and that this should occur for purposes of
identifying possible terror threats. Ironically, the corporate sector has mastered the
art of gathering, sharing and aggregating vast amounts of information and sharing
that information, for profit, among untold data purchaser seeking to profile and
market to each and every one of us.
In this environment, what can possibly be done to protect individual privacy
and security and the integrity of the identity that has been formulated from the bits
of data collected about each one of us? The answer to that question lies in more
effective legislative efforts such as those that require notice to data subjects that
their information has been compromised. Such proposals should not occur in a
vacuum. Rather, an effort must be made to review and revise privacy protective
legislation to ensure both that gaps are filled and that redundancies and ineffective
and counter-productive approaches are removed. Indeed, as new legislation is
adopted, there should be an effort to take overlapping ineffective or redundant laws
off the books.
The problem is that from a political perspective, the money and clout lies with
data aggregators rather than data subjects. Perhaps continuous bad press about
security breaches and examples of serious harm will be the impetus to force the
adoption of legislation that effectively protects individual data subjects. Current
incentives in both the private and the government realms favor greater commercial
and government access to individual information and less transparency about the
collection and use of this information. On the government end, fears about terrorism
have rendered people more willing to tolerate ever greater intrusions into personal
privacy in tandem with increased government secrecy about the acquisition and use
of this information. On the commercial end, the monetary incentives for collecting
information for purposes of target marketing, trend tracking, debt collection and
other moneymaking purposes far outweigh any existing negative consequences for
the misuse of information.
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should develop policies and practices that eliminate from public
view (and perhaps from court records generally) high risk data
elements that are not germane to the public purposes of access,
while retaining discretion to safeguard sensitive information
within public case records and proceedings.
Consistent with their role in our system of separated powers
and checks and balances, courts must keep the focus of their
access policies on the courts' role as administrators of justice and
on the reasons for providing public access that are related to that
role. To ensure that judges and court personnel do this in a
manner that is consistent with the appropriate balancing of
competing concerns, efforts should be made to improve judicial
education and the education and training of court personnel and
lawyers to smooth the transition to the paperless court and to
avoid the imposition of blunt and overbroad (or overly narrow or
non-existent) restrictions. At the same time, to address the
broader privacy and security concerns posed by Internet access,
courts should communicate to the legislative branch the concerns
they see that relate to court records information and encourage
legislation that cabins private sector and government use of
personal information so that courts may remain focused on their
core interests in public access that promotes transparency, public
confidence, and effective judicial administration.

